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CRYPTOCURRENCY AND THE MYTH OF THE 
TRUSTLESS TRANSACTION
Rebecca M. Bratspies
“It’s going to prevent wars, help the unbanked and bring honesty to 
financial systems.”1
“It’s worse than tulip bulbs. It won’t end well. Someone is going to get 
killed,”2
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1. Kirsten Grind, Let Me Tell You Some More About Bitcoin Hello? Hello?, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 19, 2018, 11:02 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mention-bitcoin-one-more-time-
and-youre-sleeping-on-the-couch-1516377771 (quoting Doug Scribner, 50, of Edina, Minn.).
2. Fred Imbert, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon Says Bitcoin is a ‘Fraud’ that Will 
Eventually Blow Up, CNBC (Sep. 12, 2017, 1:27 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/12/
jpmorgan-ceo-jamie-dimon-raises-flag-on-trading-revenue-sees-20-percent-fall-for-the-third-
quarter.html.
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I.  Introduction
Imagine a globally-accepted virtual currency able to facilitate virtually 
costless transactions3 at near lightning speed.4 Now imagine that this cur-
rency is open-source and decentralized.5 Then add an unalterable, tamper-
free recording feature to guarantee that every transaction 100% secure, and 
throw in anonymity to boot.6 Finally, eliminate the need to trust third par-
ties by making this currency independent of central banks or financial insti-
tutions.7 This is the basic pitch for cryptocurrency—from Bitcoin to the 
thousands of alt-coins8 that have followed in its wake. It is not hard to find 
true believers touting each of these supposed cryptocurrency traits as though 
they were gospel.
The term “hodl”9 captures some of the evangelical fervor of bitcoin’s 
proponents. An inside joke in the cryptocurrency world, hodl stands for 
long-term commitment to cryptocurrencies in the face of wild fluctuations.10
These true believers posit a world with virtually limitless applications for 
the block chain—the technology at the core of cryptocurrencies. They sug-
gest that these virtual cryptocurrencies11 will replace fiat currencies, includ-
3. See e.g., JERRY BRITO AND ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR
POLICYMAKERS 13 (2016) (asserting that, “Because there is no third-party intermediary, 
bitcoin transactions can be cheaper and quicker than traditional payment networks”).
4. See Felix Küster, The War of Cryptocurrencies: Ripple vs. Ethereum vs. Bitcoin,
CAPTAINALTCOIN.COM (Dec. 8, 2017), https://captainaltcoin.com/ripple-vs-ethereum-vs-
bitcoin/ (describing bitcoin as “frictionless, anonymous, and cryptographically astonishingly 
secure”).
5. BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
6. Bitcoin for Individuals, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/bitcoin-for-individuals (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2018).
7. Patrick Mansfield, A Bitcoin Guide: A Brief History, How to Buy, and the Latest 
Quote, USCONSUMERFINANCE, https://www.usconsumerfinance.com/bitcoin-information
(last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
8. Altcoins are cryptocurrencies other than Bitcoin, the first such digital currency. 
See Altcoin: Definition of ‘Altcoin’, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/a/altcoin.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
9. “Hodling” is an inside joke in the cryptocurrency world. It stems from a typo in a 
drunken rant by a user named GameKyuubi on the Bitcoin Forum in 2013. See GameKyuubi, 
I am Hodling, BITCOIN FORUM (Dec. 23, 2013, 10:03 AM), https://bitcointalk.org/
index.php?topic=375643.0?red; see also rafaelnorman, what’s HODL?, REDDIT (Jul. 20, 
2014, 6:37 PM), https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2b8t78/whats_hodl/.
10. In comment after comment, “hodlers” advised the original poster to relax and wait 
for the inevitable bounce as the market returns to “normal.” See Maxnilu, Why Are All Cryp-
tos Dropping In Price?, BITCOIN FORUM (Feb. 01, 2018, 12:10 PM), https://bitcointalk.org/
index.php?topic=2862588.0.
11. “The Financial Action Task Force defines ‘virtual currency’ as: a digital representa-
tion of value that can be digitally traded and functions as: (1) a medium of exchange; and/or 
(2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of value, but does not have legal tender status (i.e., 
when tendered to a creditor, is a valid and legal offer of payment) in any jurisdiction. It is not 
issued or guaranteed by any jurisdiction, and fulfils the above functions only by agreement 
within the community of users of the virtual currency. Virtual currency is distinguished from 
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ing the dollar, the yen and the euro. So far, the reality of cryptocurrency has 
not lived up to its hype. It turns out that cryptocurrency transactions can be 
slow12 and expensive,13 because the core technology, the blockchain,14 scales 
poorly.15 These technological issues may or may not be fixable. However, 
the most interesting divergence between this marketing pitch and cryptocur-
rency’s actual track record have to do with the purported consequences of 
decentralization16—the claim that bitcoin obviates the need for trust.
In an increasingly volatile world, cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin purport 
to replace trust with technology. Indeed, Bitcoin founder, Satoshi Nakamoto 
described Bitcoin as an “electronic payment system based on cryptographic 
proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly
with each other without the need for a trusted third party.”17 In the 2008 
fiat currency (a.k.a. ‘real currency,’ ‘real money,’ or ‘national currency’), which is the coin 
and paper money of a country that is designated as its legal tender; circulates; and is customar-
ily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the issuing country. It is distinct from e-
money, which is a digital representation of fiat currency used to electronically transfer value 
denominated in fiat currency.” Financial Action Task Force [FATF], Report on Virtual Cur-
rencies—Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks, at 4 (Jun. 2014), http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-
aml-cft-risks.pdf.
12. In July 2017, the average transaction time was 116 minutes. See, Alex Lielacher, 
How Long Should My Bitcoin Transaction Take?, BITCOIN MKT. J. (Jul. 6, 2017, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.bitcoinmarketjournal.com/how-long-bitcoin-transactions/. In February 2017, 
transactions ranged from 14 minutes to 454 minutes, depending on the day. See Average Con-
firmation Time, BLOCKCHAIN, https://www.blockchain.com/charts/avg-confirmation-
time?timespan=2years (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
13. See Ryan Browne, Big Transaction Fees are a Problem for Bitcoin—but There 
Could Be a Solution, CNBC (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/19/big-
transactions-fees-are-a-problem-for-bitcoin.html. Bitcoin is what one user described as a 
“pay-to-play protocol.” See brianddk, Comment to Average Confirmation Times, REDDIT 
(Mar. 2, 2016, 2:31 PM), https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/48m9xq/
average_confirmation_times/. Adding a fee to a bitcoin transaction bumps that transaction up 
in the queue. Those who do not pay a fee, or do not pay a sufficiently big fee, can wait hours 
or even days for their transaction to complete. See e.g., fluffy1337, PSA: Due to Delays, If you 
Buy Bitcoins Make Sure to Keep Them On An Exchange or They May Get Stuck in Transit for 
a While, REDDIT (Mar. 2, 2016, 8:23 PM), https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/48pkrw/
psa_due_to_delays_if_you_buy_bitcoins_make_sure/; see also, caveman2, I Have Issues With 
My Bitcoin Returned, LOCALBITCOINS.COM (Mar. 2, 2016, 7:33 PM), https://
localbitcoins.com/forums/#!/general-discussion:i-have-issues-with-my-bitco.
14. See infra pp. 19–29 for a detailed discussion of Blockchains.
15. Darryn Pollock, SegWit2x’s Failure Confirms Bitcoin’s Status as Digital Gold, 
COINTELEGRAPH (Nov. 14, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/segwit2xs-failure-
confirms-bitcoins-status-as-digital-gold (quoting Morgan Stanley analysts).
16. See, What is Bitcoin?, COINDESK (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/
information/what-is-bitcoin/ (“Bitcoin’s most important characteristic is that it is decentral-
ized. No single institution controls the bitcoin network. It is maintained by a group of volun-
teer coders, and run by an open network of dedicated computers spread around the world.”).
17. SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 1
(2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. The protocol behind the blockchain was first described 
in 1998 by Wei Dai. Wei Dai, bmoney, Wei Dai (1998), http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt.
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whitepaper that launched Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto criticized existing 
electronic payment systems for requiring a trusted third-party intermedi-
ary.18 Nakamoto wrote the Bitcoin white paper during the depths of the 2008 
financial crisis, when trust in the ability of governments and banks to man-
age the economy was at its nadir.19 A decade later, the so-called “trustless”
nature of cryptocurrency is still a big selling point. For example, the crypto-
currency news site Coindesk offers a Bitcoin 101 which touted that: “You 
don’t need to trust anyone else.”20 Coindesk went on to explain that in the 
conventional banking system, there are multiple points at which trust comes 
into play: “You have to trust the bank, for example. You might have to trust 
a third-party payment processor. You’ll often have to trust the merchant too. 
These organizations demand important, sensitive pieces of information from 
you.”21 With the blockchain, by contrast, cryptocurrency’s boosters claim 
that trust, along with centralization, is no longer necessary.22
Depending on who you ask, Bitcoin, and cryptocurrencies more gener-
ally, are either “world-changing”23 and “the wave of the future,”24 or, alter-
natively, are a mania,25 “more religion than asset,”26 “rat poison squared”27
18. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 1.
19. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT: DISTRUST,
DISCONTENT, ANGER AND PARTISAN RANCOR 4–5 (2010), http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/legacy-pdf/606.pdf (noting that an October 2008 poll found that only 
17% of respondents trusted the government to do what was right).
20. Why Use Bitcoin?, CYBER SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (Jun. 1, 2015), https://
www.cybersecurityintelligence.com/blog/why-use-bitcoin-323.html.
21. Id.
22. See e.g., Bryan Chia, What is Cryptocurrency? (Part 2: Trustless, Decentralized & 
Immutable), MEDIUM (Nov. 27, 2017), https://medium.com/@dashrandom/what-is-
cryptocurrency-part-2-trustless-decentralized-immutable-c6e82833bd5c.
23. See generally THE RISE AND RISE OF BITCOIN (Fair Acre Films & 44th Floor Pro-
ductions 2014), https://bitcoindoc.com/.
24. Mike Ayers, ‘Shark Tank’ Investor Robert Herjavec Has a Bold Prediction for the 
Future of Cryptocurrency, MONEY (Feb. 8, 2018), http://time.com/money/5137464/shark-
tank-investor-robert-herjavec-has-a-bold-prediction-for-the-future-of-cryptocurrency/. A re-
cent New York Times article quoted one enthusiast as proclaiming: “It’s the entire world reor-
ganizing itself. We could get rid of our armies because for the first time you’ll have people 
saying, ‘I want to vote for a global order.’ It’s the internet waking up — it’s the internet grab-
bing its pitchfork. That’s the blockchain.” Nellie Bowles, Everyone is Getting Hilariously 
Rich and You’re Not, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/13/style/
bitcoin-millionaires.html (quoting James Fickel).
25. Felix Allen, ‘Absolutely Bananas’ Bitcoin Bubble Fears as Cryptocurrency Soars 
Toward Record $10,000 with Half a Million New Investors a Day, SUN (Nov. 28, 2017), 
https://www.thesun.co.uk/money/5016647/bitcoin-bubble-crash-price-record/.
26. A.J. Dellinger, Bitcoin, Cryptocurrency Predictions 2018: What Mark Cuban 
Thinks About the Future of the Currency, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2018), http://
www.ibtimes.com/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-predictions-2018-what-mark-cuban-thinks-about-
future-coins-2643150 (quoting Mark Cuban).
27. Paul R. La Monica, Warren Buffett Says Bitcoin is “Rat Poison”, CNN (May 8, 
2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/07/investing/warren-buffett-bitcoin/index.html.
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or even a fraud.28 Regardless of which camp one falls into, there is no ques-
tion that the touted security of the blockchain has not prevented thieves and 
scam artists from stealing millions of dollars of cryptocurrency. Indeed, the 
combination of rapidly rising cryptocurrency values, anonymity, and lack of 
regulation make cryptocurrency platforms29 “natural targets” for theft.30 As 
of late 2017, Reuters estimated that 980,000 coins, worth up to $15 billion 
had been stolen between 2011 and 2017.31 And that was before the January 
2018, when hackers stole $534 million from Japanese cryptocurrency plat-
form CoinCheck,32 not to mention the June 2018 hacks of Korean cryptocur-
rency platforms Coinrail ($42 billion in market value loss)33 and Bithumb 
($30 million in coins stolen).34
This article interrogates the claim that trust can be replaced with block-
chain technology. Part I begins with an introduction that provides an over-
view of the trust issues surrounding cryptocurrency. Part II then outlines the 
role that trust plays in a financial market more generally, focusing specifi-
cally on the trust embedded in what cryptocurrency supporters derogate as a 
‘fiat’ currency. Part III introduces the blockchain, as well as Bitcoin and 
28. Imbert, supra note 2. To be fair, Jamie Dimon has since said that he regrets calling 
bitcoin a fraud. Tae Kim, J.P. Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon Says He Regrets Calling Bitcoin a 
Fraud, USA TODAY (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2018/01/
09/j-p-morgan-chase-ceo-jamie-dimon-says-he-regrets-calling-bitcoin-fraud/1016088001/. 
However, Dimon still refers to Bitcoin as a “scam.” William Suberg, JPMorgan CEO Jamie 
Dimon Returns to Bitcoin Bashing, Calls Cryptocurrency a Scam, COIN TELEGRAPH (Aug. 8, 
2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/jpmorgan-ceo-jamie-dimon-returns-to-bitcoin-bashing-
calls-cryptocurrency-a-scam.
29. Although cryptocurrency platforms are often called “exchanges,” the SEC cautions 
investors that these platforms are unregulated, and “there is no reason to believe [that 
information provided by these platforms] has the same integrity as that provided by national 
securities exchanges.” SEC, STATEMENT ON POTENTIALLY UNLAWFUL ONLINE 
PLATFORMS FOR TRADING DIGITAL ASSETS (2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/
public-statement/enforcement-tm-statement-potentially-unlawful-online-platforms-trading.
30. See Steven Melendez, Bitcoin Heist Adds $77 Million to Total Hacked Hauls of $15 
Billion, FASTCOMPANY (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40505199/bitcoin-
heist-adds-77-million-to-hacked-hauls-of-15-billion.
31. Jim Finkle & Jeremy Wagstaff, Hackers Steal $64 Million from Cryptocurrency 
Firm NiceHash, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us.-cyber-
nicehash/hackers-steal-64-million-from-cryptocurrency-firm-nicehash-idUSKBN1E10AQ.
32. Guarav Sharma, ‘Crypto Heist’: Coincheck Hack Could Be the World’s Biggest 
Every CryptoCurrency Theft, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
gauravsharma/2018/01/27/crypto-heist-coincheck-hack-could-be-the-worlds-biggest-ever-
cryptocurrency-theft/#6c99af91d583.
33. Eric Lam, Jiyuen Lee & Jordan Robertson, Cryptocurrencies Lose $42 Billion After 
South Korean Bourse Hacked, BLOOMBERG (June 10, 2018, 5:31 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-10/bitcoin-tumbles-most-in-two-weeks-
amid-south-korea-exchange-hack.
34. Saheli Roy Choudhury, South Korean Cryptocurrency Exchange Bithumb Says It 
Was Hacked and $30 Million in Coins Was Stolen, CNBC (June 19, 2018, 10:46 PM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2018/06/19/south-korea-crypto-exchange-bithumb-says-it-was-hacked-coins-
stolen.html.
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cryptocurrency more generally. Part IV then tests the claims that Bitcoin 
eliminates the need for trust against real world experiences of Bitcoin hold-
ers and markets. This section disaggregates the blockchain technology itself 
from how actual people typically use Bitcoin or any of the follow-on cryp-
tocurrencies. It documents the many points at which cryptocurrencies shifts 
the locus of embedded trust, rather than eliminating the need for such trust. 
Finally, Part V concludes that rather than replacing trust, cryptocurrencies 
instead require users to repose their trust in less transparent, less reliable and 
less accountable parties. The ultimate message is that caveat emptor should 
be a consumer watchword, and that users should understand that many legal 
protections they take for granted may not apply when purchasing cryptocur-
rency.
II.  Before Cryptocurrency: The Fiat Money System
The back of all United States currency carries the motto “In God We 
Trust.” Yet people using that money often pay little attention to the many 
levels of earthly trust embedded in that currency. Money played a critical 
role in the rise of a division of labor, and the move from a subsistence to a 
market economy. The need for a “double coincidence of wants”35 chal-
lenged the scope of barter systems, giving rise to the need for a more flexi-
ble unit of exchange.36 At first salt, metals (like gold or silver), or wampum 
filled this need—serving as a store of value and a unit of exchange.37 But the 
dangers and logistics associated with storage and transportation presented 
thorny problems that limited the utility of these items.38 Traders shifted to 
receipts that could be exchanged as representatives of the underlying com-
modities.
The modern monetary system is dominated by fiat currencies regulated 
by national governments. Modern money is called “fiat money” because it 
has no intrinsic value. It is, instead, established by governmental decree—or 
fiat—and backed by the full faith and credit of that government. Until 1933, 
money issued by the United States was not fiat money, but was instead rep-
resentative money, meaning that it was representative of a comparable 
amount of gold. The back of each such dollar read “this note is legal tender 
for all debts, public and private, and is redeemable in lawful money at the
35. Mike Moffatt, The Double Coincidence of Wants, THOUGHTCO. (Feb. 22, 2018), 
https://www.thoughtco.com/the-double-coincidence-of-wants-defintion-1147998.
36. Id.
37. See generally A. HINGSTON QUIGGIN, A SURVEY OF PRIMITIVE MONEY: THE 
BEGINNINGS OF CURRENCY (1947); JACK WEATHERFORD, A HISTORY OF MONEY 20-35
(2009).
38. WEATHERFORD, supra note 37, at 20-25.
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United States Treasury or at any Federal Reserve Bank.”39 On June 5, 1933, 
President Roosevelt signed House Joint Resolution 192, the so-called “Gold
Repeal Resolution” into law.40 This Joint Resolution declared that obliga-
tions purporting to give the right to require payment in gold were against 
public policy.41 The Resolution then went on to announce that any such 
debts would now be payable in “any coin or currency which at the time is 
legal tender for public and private debts.”42 By fiat, the United States 
changed the terms by which currency issued by the United States was held.43
To be considered money, a currency must fulfill three roles: it must 
serve as a store for value, be a unit of account, and function as a medium of 
exchange. Despite the changes wrought by the Gold Repeal Resolution, 
United States currency still fulfilled all three criteria. Comparing the fiat 
money, printed by the United States government, with Monopoly money, 
printed by the Parker Brothers44, can help clarify how fiat money works. 
While the United States $100 bill is fancier than the Monopoly $100 bill 
(and has Benjamin Franklin on its front), the real difference has to do with 
its relationship to the government. You can pay your bills with the Benja-
min Franklin $100 and not the Monopoly money because the United States 
government has, by fiat, declared its money to be “legal tender for all debts, 
public and private.”45 One of the Federal Reserve banks issues the currency, 
and a network of banks handle the transactions. The Benjamin Franklin 
$100 is not backed by gold, but by its power to purchase goods or services 
in the economy.46 By contrast, the Monopoly money has value in the game, 
but nowhere else.
Law is the tool that government uses to regulate, and thus legitimate, a 
fiat currency. As one commenter noted, “[v]aults filled with gold have been 
39. Lawful money in this context referred to gold. See Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, FAQ: What Is Lawful Money? How Is It Different from Legal Tender?
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_15197.htm (last updated Sept. 29, 2011). It was 
President Grant who put the country on a gold standard when he signed the Coinage Act of 
1873, which ended gold/silver bimetallism in the United States and demonetizing silver. See
Office of Corporate Communications, U.S. Mint History: The “Crime of 1873,” U.S. MINT
(Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.usmint.gov/news/inside-the-mint/mint-history-crime-of-1873.
40. H.R.J. Res. 192, 73d Cong. (1933).
41. Id. at § 1(a).
42. Id.
43. Subsequently, Congress enacted a law that prohibited the government from paying 
out gold, even in response to a gold clause in a public debt obligation. See Gold Clause and 
Consent to Sue, 31 U.S.C § 5118(b) (1997).
44. I am indebted to N. Gregory Mankiw for this example. See N. GREGORY MANKIW,
BRIEF PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 222 (2014).
45. This language, which is reproduced on all U.S. bills, comes from the Coinage Act 
of 1965, 31 U.S.C. § 5103, entitled “Legal tender,” which states: “United States coins and 
currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and 
national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues.”
46. See e.g., Stephanie Bell, The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money, 25
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 149, 153-57 (2001).
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replaced by law and trust.”47 There is no question that trust in the law is an 
indispensable attribute of modern monetary systems. For example, a busi-
ness willing to accept a check as payment for service does so in the context 
of fraud protection in the banking system, and the law of negotiable instru-
ments. This remains true even though it is highly likely that the business 
representative does not consciously consider the soundness of the banking 
system or the Uniform Commercial Code when making this decision. Thus, 
an invisible edifice of law generates the trust that makes the individual 
transaction possible.48 Without trust in the banking system, such transactions 
become extremely risky. The Federal Reserve Banks are tasked with main-
taining the stability of the money supply in order to cultivate this trust.
Without trust in the legitimacy of a currency as a holder of value and a 
medium of exchange, a state’s social institutions can disintegrate.49 Indeed, 
collapse of trust in the monetary system is generally considered a sign of a 
social system under severe strain.50 This was the situation after Lehman 
Brothers, Bear Stearns, and AIG imploded, and other major “too big to fail”
banks needed a federal bailout.
During the depth of the resulting financial crisis, Satoshi Nokamoto 
wrote the Bitcoin White Paper.51 He asserted that “[t]he root problem with 
conventional currency is all the trust that’s required to make it work. The 
central bank must be trusted not to debase the currency, but the history of 
fiat currencies is full of breaches of that trust. Banks must be trusted to hold 
our money and transfer it electronically, but they lend it out in waves of 
credit bubbles with barely a fraction in reserve.”52 Echoing this lament, 
cryptocurrency supporters like to claim that “the problem with regular fiat 
currency is that governments can print as much of it as they like, and they 
frequently do.”53 Unlike fiat currency, Nokamoto’s Bitcoin is finite—the 
Bitcoin protocol was designed so that only 21 million Bitcoins can ever be
47. Markus Iofcea et al., The Future of Currencies, FORBES (Oct. 28, 2016, 10:08 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ubs/2016/10/28/the-future-of-currencies/#551c41a623ef.
48. See Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2001) for a discus-
sion advocating that “law cannot produce trust.” Conversely, see Tamar Frankel, Trusting and 
Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REV. 457, 459 (2001), for a discussion arguing that 
trust requires law.
49. The link between monetary instability, rampant inflation, and social unrest has long 
been recognized. See, for example, The Political Cost of Inflation, ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2008), 
https://www.economist.com/news/2008/04/04/the-political-cost-of-inflation.
50. See, for example, Matthew Boesler, WEIMAR: The Truth About History’s Most 
Infamous Hyperinflation Horror Story, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 20, 2013), https://
www.businessinsider.com/weimar-germany-hyperinflation-explained-2013-9.
51. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin Open Source Implementation of P2P Currency, P2P
FOUNDATION (Feb. 11, 2009, 10:27 PM), http://p2pfoundation.ning.com/forum/topics/
bitcoin-open-source.
52. Id.
53. See Why Use Bitcoin?, supra note 20.
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created. Many cryptocurrency aficionados liken this fixed supply limitation 
to reinstating the gold standard, this time without banks or governments.54
There is no question that the 2008 financial crisis badly damaged trust 
in banks, and in the governmental regulators who oversee them.55 Things 
have gotten worse. Since the Trump administration began, the United States 
has experienced the steepest decline of trust ever measured.56 And, the more 
informed a member of the public is, the more his/her trust in this administra-
tion’s handling of the United States government has plummeted.57 Indeed, 
among the informed public, the United States has crashed from sixth place 
to dead last on the Edelman Trust Barometer, a global trust index that ranks 
28 countries.58 In comparison with the rest of the world, the United States 
has experienced a staggering and extreme loss of trust over a very short pe-
riod of time.59 While this recent decline in trust has been both steep and pro-
found,60 it is part of  a larger trend. Over the past few decades, ever larger 
percentages of the United States population express a belief that the gov-
ernment is run for the benefit of a few big interests, rather than for the bene-
fit of all.61
Many thinkers have emphasized the importance of trust for governance.  
For example, Sissela Bok argued that social trust is essential for an ethically 
grounded society.62 Niklas Luhmann asserted that to trust is to organize 
54. Fuathan, Bitcoin as a Gold Standard, BITCOIN FORUM (Jan. 10, 2016, 06:33 PM), 
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1322343.0; Wences Cesares, Bitcoin: The New Gold 
Standard, YOUTUBE (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yPIvqJsCOSo.
55. David Leonhardt, Lesson from a Crisis: When Trust Vanishes, Worry, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/business/economy/01leonhardt.html;
Sarah Knapton, Financial Crisis: Home Safe Sales Soar as Trust in Banks Collapses,
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 9, 2008, 9:19 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/
savings/3163645/Financial-crisis-Home-safe-sales-soar-as-trust-in-bankscollapses.html.
56. 2018 Edelman Trust Barometer, EDELMAN INTELLIGENCE, 6 (Jan. 2018), https://
cms.edelman.com/sites/default/files/2018-01/
2018%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Global%20Report.pdf (reporting a decline of 
9% in trust in the United States—by far the greatest decrease in the world).
57. Id. at 7 (reporting a 23% decline of the informed public’s trust in the United States).
58. Id. at 11 (tallying responses to a question that asked: “Below is a list of institutions. 
For each one, please indicate how much you trust that institution to do what is right using a 
nine-point scale, where one means that you ‘do not trust them at all’ and nine means that you 
‘trust them a great deal.’”).
59. Id. at 9 (reporting an aggregate loss of trust in the U.S. at 37%).
60. Id.
61. The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, AM. NAT’L ELECTION 
STUDIES, http://anesold.isr.umich.edu/nesguide/text/tab5a_2.txt (last updated Nov. 11, 2015)
(tallying responses to the question: “Would you say that the government is pretty much run by 
a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the peo-
ple?”).
62. SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 26-27 (1978).
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one’s world.63 The growing lack of trust in the United States raises profound 
questions about the legitimacy of government decisions.64 This crisis of trust 
poses special problems for currency markets. After all, the very idea of 
money as a unit of exchange is a social construct that relies on trust; fiat pa-
per currency even more so. It works only because “everyone collectively 
agrees to participate in the fantasy that a dollar bill is worth a dollar, what-
ever that is.”65 As long as people believe in it, a currency will have value. A 
crisis in trust in the government or the banks can create a currency crisis.
All the conditions for such a crisis seem to be in place. Trust in the 
United States government has plummeted. At the same time, the financial 
sector is the least trusted sector of the global economy,66 while technology is 
the most trusted sector.67 In this context, it is perhaps not surprising to see 
the rise of cryptocurrency, which rejects the relationship between currency, 
government and trust, and seeks to replace the roles filled by both govern-
ments and trust with technology.68 Indeed, cryptocurrency bull Tom Lee of 
Fundstrat Global Advisors explicitly ties falling trust in government to the 
growth of cryptocurrency.69
Even without cratering levels of trust, the rise of the internet, and the 
growth of digital transactions has challenged fiat currencies. Electronic 
payments, which typically exchange digital credits at blinding speed, have 
become the norm. For example, Visa processes an average of 150 million 
transactions each day, more than 24,000 per minute.70 Mastercard claims to 
63. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER (1979). Similarly, Russell Hardin calls 
trust “a way of dealing with the risks inherent in complexity.” Russell Hardin, The Street-
Level Epistemology of Trust, 21 POL. & SOC’Y 505, 516 (1993).
64. For a theoretical exploration of this topic, see generally HAROLD D. LASSWELL &
MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1992); see also, Rebecca 
Bratspies, Regulatory Trust, 51 ARIZONA L. REV. 575, 580-82 (2009).
65. Lisa Wade, Money is a Social Construct, THE SOCIETY PAGES (Apr. 24, 2014), 
https://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2014/04/24/money-as-a-social-construction/.
66. 2018 Edelman Trust Barometer, supra note 56 at 32, Sector and Home Country 
Provide Context for Business Leadership.
67. Id.
68. For a discussion of trust in the context of markets, see Catherine Martin Christo-
pher, The Bridging Model: Exploring the Roles of Trust and Enforcement in Banking, Bitcoin 
and the Blockchain, 17 NEVADA L. J. 139, 172-75 (2016).
69. Upfront Ventures, Thomas Lee Presents The Economics of Cryptocurrenices,
YOUTUBE, (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGberGnxiJk&feature=
youtu.be.
70. Visa Acceptance for Retailers, VISA, https://usa.visa.com/run-your-business/small-
business-tools/retail.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2018) (citing 2010 testing). That works out to 
roughly 1667 transactions per second. However, Visa claims to be able to handle many more 
transactions—up to 56,000 transactions per second. Jan Vermulen, VisaNet—Handling 
100,000 Transactions Per Minute, MYBROADBAND (Dec. 17, 2016), https://
mybroadband.co.za/news/security/190348-visanet-handling-100000-transactions-per-minute.
html.
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be able to handle 65,000 transactions per minute.71 Both payment networks 
achieve these processing speeds while navigating more than 150 currencies 
in more than 200 countries.72 Handling these digital transactions is big busi-
ness. In 2016 alone, global credit card issuers (Visa, Mastercard, American 
Express, DinersClub/Discover and JCB) handled purchases valued at $20.60 
trillion.73 The credit card companies serve as the trusted ledger-keeper to log 
these transactions. Their role is critical for ensuring that individuals do not 
“double-spend” digital credits by copying the information and sending it to 
two creditors at once, or by sending the copy to a creditor while retaining 
the original to use again in another transaction.74
By virtue of this role, the ledger keepers are privy to sensitive infor-
mation about anyone using a credit card, a bank transfer, or a mobile pay-
ment system. This information, along with their gatekeeping function gives 
these companies tremendous power over consumers and allows them to 
dominate key points of the digital economy. Recently, a series of high pro-
file hacks have soured the public on many formerly-trusted intermediaries.75
Companies ranging from LinkedIn, to Target, to Experian have all reported 
massive data breaches that revealed private information from millions of 
people.76 There is a growing perception that traditional data management 
practices have created an “architecture of vulnerability” that does not suffi-
71. Nikhal Subba, MasterCard’s Profits Beat Estimates as Card Spending Rises,
REUTERS (May 2, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mastercard-results/mastercards-
profit-beats-estimates-as-card-spending-rises-idUSKBN17Y1BQ.
72. MASTERCARD, ANNUAL REPORT 2016, 36 (2016), http://s2.q4cdn.com/242125233/
files/doc_financials/supplemental/2016/Mastercard-2016-Annual-Report.pdf; VISA, ANNUAL 
REPORT 2017, 5 (2017), https://s1.q4cdn.com/050606653/files/doc_financials/annual/2017/
Visa-2017-Annual-Report.pdf.
73. Issue 1124, THE NILSON REPORT (The Nilson Report), Jan. 2018, 
https://nilsonreport.com/publication_newsletter_archive_issue.php?issue=1124. This is just a 
small sliver of global commercial activity—Mastercard estimates that 85% of retail transac-
tions involve cash currency or checks. MASTERCARD, supra note 72, at 12.
74. The role of the trusted intermediary, like Visa or Mastercard, is to keep track of the 
digital credits exchanged across multiple transactions in order to prevent this kind of double-
spending. Physical money by and large does not share this problem. The parties to a transac-
tion physically transfer the asset between themselves. While counterfeiting remains a possibil-
ity, it is difficult to replicate physical currency, and the parties can verify the bona fides of the 
currency before or immediately after the exchange. The big innovation of cryptocurrency is its 
proposal to replace the role of the trusted intermediary with cryptographic puzzles.
75. See e.g., Selena Larson, The Hacks that Left Us Exposed in 2017, CNN (Dec. 20, 
2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/18/technology/biggest-cyberattacks-of-the-year/
index.html; Lily Hay Newman, The Biggest Cybersecurity Disasters of 2017 So Far, WIRED 
(July 1, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/2017-biggest-hacks-so-far/.
76. Rajeev Dhir, 13 Recent Data Breaches, Hacks You Should Know About, NJ.COM
(Feb. 24, 2017), Eric Chabrow, Experian Hack Slams T-Mobile Customers, BANK INFO 
SECURITY (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2017/02/
emails_credit_cards_biggest_data_breaches_affect_nj_residents.html; https://
www.bankinfosecurity.com/experian-breach-a-8563.
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ciently respect confidentiality.77 In the United States, and other countries 
with extreme trust losses, the public clearly feels that business does not do 
enough to protect consumers, safeguard privacy, and guard information 
quality.78
III.  Enter Cryptocurrency
What happens when the ledger keepers of fiat currency can no longer be 
trusted? Supporters see cryptocurrency as the answer. They claim that the 
immutability and irreversibility of cryptocurrency transactions offers protec-
tion from data breaches,79 and from untoward government meddling.
The key to understanding this claim is the distributed virtual ledger 
called the blockchain. Every cryptocurrency transaction is encrypted and 
recorded in the blockchain, and anyone can see that ledger. 80 Computers 
serve as a series interconnected “nodes” that maintain and verify the block-
chain consensus record of transactions. The blockchain thus provides a pub-
licly accessible system for participants to agree on a single history of trans-
actions.81 Because all full nodes in the network have a record of the 
complete blockchain, they all “have access to a shared, single source of 
truth.”82 The nodes can work together but do not need to trust each other. 
For cryptocurrency’s most ardent supporters, the notion that “code is law,”83
along with the purported immutability of the blockchain, replaces the need 
for trust.
The blockchain grows from the interaction between users, miners and 
nodes. Users contribute transactions by broadcasting them to nodes. To cre-
ate a block to add to the Bitcoin blockchain, miners compete to solve a
cryptographic puzzle, called a proof of work, in order to collect a reward in 
bitcoins.84 The proof of work involves encrypting new transaction requests, 
77. Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 
HASTINGS L. J. 1227 (2003).
78. 2018 Edelman Trust Barometer, supra note 56, at 33.
79. See Jonathan Keane, Blockchain ID Schemes Could Kill the Data Breach, but How 
Soon?, COINDESK (Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/blockchain-id-schemes-could-
kill-the-data-breach-but-how-soon/.
80. JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 4
(2013), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Brito_BitcoinPrimer_v1.3.pdf.
81. NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 2.
82. Benjamin Quinlan & Yvette Kwan, From KYC To KYT, QUINLAN & ASSOCIATES,
24 (Nov. 2016), https://www.quinlanandassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Quinlan-
Associates-From-KYC-to-KYT-new.pdf.
83. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999); 
Arvicco, Code is Law and the Quest for Justice, ETHEREUM CLASSIC BLOG (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://ethereumclassic.github.io/blog/2016-09-09-code-is-law/.
84. See Georgios Konstantopoulos, Understanding Blockchain Fundamentals, Part 2: 
Proof of Work & Proof of Stake, MEDIUM (Dec. 8, 2017), https://medium.com/loom-network/
understanding-blockchain-fundamentals-part-2-proof-of-work-proof-of-stake-
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along with information about the preceding block in the form of a 16-digit 
number called a “hash” that must be no greater than a target value (typically 
identified as starting by a certain number of zeros).85 The block’s hash 
serves as a digital fingerprint for the encrypted data, and a means to verify 
that the data has not been altered. That means that once a block is created, it 
can only be changed by redoing the entire calculation. And, as new, later 
blocks are chained to it, anyone seeking to alter a particular block, say to 
remove an included transaction, would also have to redo all the subsequent 
blocks. Thus, as blocks are added to the chain, the probability that anyone 
would succeed in redoing the work and altering the content of a transaction 
becomes very low. If there is a dispute, the longest chain, which represents 
the greatest proof-of-work effort invested, will be considered the valid 
chain, representing the “true” state of the world vis-à-vis past cryptocurren-
cy transactions, and thus current ownership of the coins.86
Miners participate in this system in order to earn the reward for success-
fully adding a block to the blockchain. A new block is added to the Bitcoin 
blockchain roughly every 10 minutes. Currently the reward is 12.5 bitcoin 
per new block added. This reward creates an incentive for miners to spend 
their time and effort competing to complete each hash. The larger and more 
dispersed a cryptocurrency network’s miner base is, the more secure it is. 
Thus, cryptocurrency holders want as many miners as possible competing to 
mine a block; more miners make the blockchain more decentralized and 
more secure. The block reward is intended to create an incentive for miners 
to add hash power to the network in order to increase their chances of win-
ning the race to complete the puzzle and claim the reward.87 This winner-
takes-all approach to mining creates something akin to a digital arms race, 
with miners buying ever-more powerful and specialized equipment to in-
crease their hash power, and thus their likelihood of obtaining the reward. A 
side effect of this arms race is a pressure on miners to centralize into mining 
b6ae907c7edb. The reward for successfully generating a block is fixed by the system itself 
and divides in half after every 210,000 blocks. The reward is currently 12.5 coins per block. 
This reward will halve by approximately May 2020. See BITCOIN BLOCK REWARD HALVING 
COUNTDOWN, http://www.bitcoinblockhalf.com/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2018). Proof of work is 
not the only blockchain verification model, but for simplicity, this article will focus on proof 
of work verification.
85. A sample proof of work for the phrase “Hello World!,” with an explanation of how 
such a hash is generated, can be found at Proof of Work, BITCOIN WIKI (last edited May 15, 
2016), https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Proof_of_work. An excellent explanation can be found at an-
tonylewis2015, A Gentle Introduction to the Immutability of Blockchains, BITS ON BLOCKS
(Feb. 29, 2016),  https://bitsonblocks.net/2016/02/29/a-gentle-introduction-to-immutability-
of-blockchains/. A more detailed, technical analysis is available from Campell R. Harvey, 
Cryptofinance (Jan. 14, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2438299.
86. See generally, NAKAMOTO, supra note 17.
87. For a good explanation accessible to users, see Ittay Eyal & Emin Gün Sirer, Ma-
jority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable, COMM. ACM, July 2018, at 95.
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pools, which share hash power in exchange for a portion of the reward for a 
successfully mined block.
As a result of the distributed, and allegedly immutable nature of the 
blockchain, users purportedly “need trust no one when using it.”88 Indeed, 
cryptocurrency advocates have taken to heart the observation that Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Advisor, reputedly made 
when asked before the 1985 arms talks in Geneva whether it made sense to 
trust the Russians. He replied that the point was “not to trust them” but “to 
find an agreement that is self-reinforcing.”89 The blockchain, and the eco-
system built around it, purports to provide that self-reinforcing legitimacy. 
Supporters make sweeping claims for the blockchain, suggesting that the 
technology will have “massive and cascading implications to the fundamen-
tals of contract, public records of transaction, securities regulation and digi-
tal identity.”90
A. Cryptocurrency in the Marketplace
Bitcoin was the first entrant into a field that has become known as cryp-
tocurrency. As such, it is frequently touted as “the world’s first completely 
decentralized currency.”91 Satoshi Nakamoto mined the first bitcoins, 
known as the genesis block in January 2009. It is no coincidence that cryp-
tocurrency’s meteoric rise began during the Great Recession—the largest 
global economic crisis since the Great Depression. Indeed, Bitcoin’s genesis 
block underscored a profound disaffection with financial markets and regu-
lators. Encoded in this very first Bitcoin block was the dire message “Chan-
cellor on brink of second bailout of banks.”92 Bitcoin began as an oddity—a
small niche product among tech geeks,93 drug dealers,94 and Hayek enthusi-
88. See Why Use Bitcoin?, supra note 20.
89. Geoffrey Hawthorne, Three Ironies in Trust, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING 
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 111, 115 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).
90. Ed Sohn, alt.Legal: Amy Wan is Making the Blockchain a Safer Place for Con-
tracts, ABOVE THE LAW (Jan. 19, 2018, 4:01 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/01/alt-legal-
amy-wan-is-making-the-blockchain-a-safer-place-for-contracts/.
91. JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, supra note 3, at 1, 47-48.
92. Joshua Davis, The Crypto-Currency, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2011), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/10/10/the-crypto-currency. Indeed, the essay by Satoshi 
Nakamoto bemoaned, “The central bank must be trusted not to debase the currency, but the 
fiat currencies is full of breaches of that trust. Banks must be trusted to hold our money and 
transfer it electronically, but they lend it out in waves of credit bubbles with barely a fraction 
in reserve.” See Nakamoto, supra note 51.
93. A Forbes headline labeled those who profited most from cryptocurrency as “freaks, 
geeks, and visionaries.” Jeff Kauflin, Forbes’ First List of Cryptocurrency’s Richest: Meet the 
Freaks, Geeks and Visionaries Minting Billions from Bitcoin Mania, 
FORBES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffkauflin/2018/02/07/cryptocurrency-
richest-people-crypto-bitcoin-ether-xrp/#163d15cf72d3. Crypto enthusiasts embrace a mantle 
of geekdom. For example, one group on the discord server Cryptoland dot tech, describes it-
self as “a bunch of blockchain hands-on tech geeks.” Somewhat incongruously, this group’s
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asts.95 Since then, cryptocurrency has gone mainstream. There are currently 
over 1500 different cryptocurrencies,96 ten of which currently have market 
capitalizations above $1 billion.97 New coins are launched almost daily. 
That said, the three largest cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin, Etherium, and Ripple, 
account for approximately 2/3 of the overall market,98 with Bitcoin alone 
amounting to 40% of the cryptocurrency market currently.99
self-proclaimed mission is “to become a trustmark within blockchain ecosystem.”
CRYPTOLAND DOT TECH, https://cryptoland.tech/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
94. Even as they have become more respectable, cryptocurrencies have not entirely 
shed their connections with crime. See The U.S. Marshalls are Auctioning off $52 Million in 
Bitcoin Seized from Drug Dealers, FORTUNE (Jan. 11, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/01/11/
bitcoin-drug-dealer-auction/; Rebecca Camber & Chris Greenwood, Drug Dealers Use 
Bitcoin Cashpoints to Launder Money, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 3, 2017), http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5142033/Drug-dealers-using-bitcoin-cashpoints-launder-
money.html; Darryn Pollock, Bitcoin at Center of Dark Web Drug Dealing Case in Holland,
COIN TELEGRAPH (Oct. 26, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/bitcoin-in-center-of-dark-
web-drug-dealing-case-in-holland; Joshua Althauser, Why Cryptocurrencies are Increasingly 
Becoming A Favorite Among Criminals, COIN TELEGRAPH (Oct. 5, 2017), https://
cointelegraph.com/news/why-are-cryptocurrencies-increasingly-becoming-a-favorite-among-
criminals; Andy Greenberg, Monero, the Drug Dealer’s Cryptocurrency of Choice, is on Fire,
WIRED (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/monero-drug-dealers-
cryptocurrency-choice-fire/; see also Sanjana Varghese, The Bitcoin Boom is a Surprise Wind-
fall for Druggies, THE NEW STATESMAN (Dec. 12, 2017) https://www.newstatesman.com/
science-tech/future-proof/2017/12/bitcoin-boom-surprise-windfall-druggies.
95. According to the European Central Bank, the theoretical foundations for Bitcoin lie 
in the “Austrian School of economics and its criticism of the current fiat money system” spe-
cifically government and central bank monetary interventions into the economy, which the 
Austrian economists believe exacerbates inflation. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, VIRTUAL 
CURRENCY SCHEMES 22 (2012). For a description of these views, see FREDERICK A. HAYEK,
DENATIONALIZATION OF MONEY (1976) (arguing for an end to the government monopoly 
over currency); see also Ferdinando M. Ametrano, Hayek Money: The Cryptocurrency Price 
Stability Solution (Aug. 13, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2425270.
96. The analysis offered in this article applies to bitcoin specifically. Much of the anal-
ysis also applies to other cryptocurrencies, but each coin has its own characteristics, which 
may make some of the points raised inapplicable.
97. All Cryptocurrencies, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/
(last visited Nov. 23, 2018). In March 2017, there were 1500 cryptocurrencies, twenty-five of
which had market capitalizations above $1 billion. These statistics had to be continually re-
vised downward during the writing and editing of this article to reflect the plummeting value 
of cryptocurrencies as a whole, and Bitcoin in particular.
98. Cryptocurrencies are extremely volatile.  Cryptocurrency’s total market capitaliza-
tion peaked in January 2018 at over $825 billion. Andrew Marshall, Combined Crypto Market 
Capitalization Races Past $800 Bln, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 7, 2018), https://
cointelegraph.com/news/combined-crypto-market-capitalization-races-past-800-bln. One 
month later, cryptocurrency’s total market capitalization had fallen to $303 billion, Total 
Market Capitalization, COINMARKETCAP https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/ (last visited Dec. 
18, 2018), and on August 14, it briefly dipped below $190 billion. Stan Higgins, Below $200 
Billion: Crypto Market Sinks to New 2018 Low, COINDESK (Aug. 14, 2018), https://
www.coindesk.com/below-200-billion-crypto-market-sinks-to-new-2018-low/.
99. Valued at roughly $180 billion on February 27, 2018, and $101 billion at the end of 
June. Bitcoin Charts, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/ (last 
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The first known commercial use of Bitcoin has become the stuff of leg-
ends. In 2010, a programmer and early Bitcoin miner offered 10,000 
Bitcoins to anyone who would bring him two Papa John’s pizzas.100 The 
programmer, who valued those bitcoins at 0.003 cents apiece, thought buy-
ing two pizzas with $30 of found money was “cool.”101 By January 2013, 
that Bitcoin had an ascribed value of $13 per coin,102 which translated into a 
per pizza purchase price of $65,000. By October of that year, Bitcoin was 
valued at $1000, or $5 million for each pizza. Since then, Bitcoin’s value 
has gyrated wildly upwards, most recently rising to a peak of $19,783.06 on 
December 17, 2017.103 At its peak, Bitcoin had an overall market valuation 
of over $300 billion (for perspective, that figure is equivalent to Bank of 
America’s market capitalization in December 2017).104 At that peak valua-
tion, the Bitcoin paid for each pizza was worth nearly $99 million. The par-
ty was short-lived. Bitcoin ended 2017 at $14,290, down more than $5000 
from its high of a few weeks earlier, but it still gained 1400% over the 
course of the year.105
visited Nov. 23, 2018). In February 2017, by contrast, Bitcoin had about 85% market share of 
the cryptocurrency sector. Bitcoin Transaction Volume is Puzzling Investors, FORTUNE (Mar. 
2, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/03/02/bitcoin-price-transaction-volume/.
100. Julie Bort, May 22 is Bitcoin Pizza Day Thanks to these Two Pizzas Worth $5 Mil-
lion, BUS. INSIDER (May 21, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/may-22-bitcoin-pizza-
day-2014-5.  The pizzas were not actually purchased with Bitcoin, but were paid to someone 
who responded to an online posting offering to pay 10,000 bitcoin to anyone who brought the 
poster pizza.  For a list of the companies that currently accept cryptocurrency, see Jonas Cho-
kun, What Accepts Bitcoins As Payment?, 99BITCOINS (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://99bitcoins.com/who-accepts-bitcoins-payment-companies-stores-take-bitcoins/.
101. Nick Bilton, Disruptions: Betting On a Coin With No Realm, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 
2013), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/disruptions-betting-on-bitcoin/.
102. Bitcoin, The Nationless Electronic Cash Beloved by Hackers, Bursts into Financial 
Mainstream, FOX NEWS (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2013/04/11/bitcoin-
electronic-cash-beloved-by-hackers.html.
103. David Z. Morris, Bitcoin Hits a New Record High But Stops Short of $20,000,
FORTUNE (Dec. 17, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/17/bitcoin-record-high-short-of-
20000/.
104. Bank of America Corporation Market Cap, YCHARTS, https://ycharts.com/
companies/BAC/market_cap (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
105. Adam Shell, Bitcoin Price: Digital Currency Had Big Swings in 2017, USA
TODAY (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/12/29/bitcoin-price-
digital-currency-had-big-swings-2017/988544001/; Barbara Kollmeyer, Bitcoin Futures 
Trade Near $20,000 in Debut on World’s Biggest Exchange, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 18, 
2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/bitcoin-futures-debut-on-worlds-biggest-
exchange-at-20000-then-pull-back-2017-12-18. That outsize gain did not even put Bitcoin on 
the Top 10 list for best cryptocurrency performers of 2017.  Joon Ian Wong, Here are the Top 
10 CryptoAssets of 2017 (and Bitcoin’s 1,000% Rise Doesn’t Even Make the List, QUARTZ
(Jan. 1, 2018), https://qz.com/1169000/ripple-was-the-best-performing-cryptocurrency-of-
2017-beating-bitcoin/. Over that same time period, 13 altcoins outpaced Bitcoin, with Ripple, 
the third-largest cryptocurrency gaining the most at 36,018%, and Ethereum, the second-
largest cryptocurrency, gaining 9162%. Id.
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On February 6, 2018 Bitcoin plummeted to $5920.106 In the process, the 
total cryptocurrency market value fell more than $55 billion in ascribed val-
ue107—roughly the market capitalization of Aetna.108 Bitcoin spent Spring 
2018 bouncing around between $7500 and $10,000,109 before falling below 
$6000 in late June.110 This recent gyration was just one of many wild swings 
in value for the cryptocurrency. Just a few months earlier, in September of 
2017, Bitcoin had experienced a similar wild ride, losing $30 billion in mar-
ket cap.111 In late June and early July of 2017, Bitcoin’s valuation had 
plunged 36%.112 Indeed, one self-described bitcoin bull admits that the cur-
rency is “prone to 40% corrections.”113
Other cryptocurrencies are similarly volatile. The market valuation for 
cryptocurrencies as a class peaked on January 10, 2018 at $828 billion.114 At 
the time, noted crypto-bull Tom Lee, bragged that “if crypto was a na-
tion, . . . it [would be] the 19th largest country market . . . Its bigger than 
Brazil, and Spain, Ireland, and Greece.”115 He then went on to project that if 
cryptocurrencies reached his predicted target, they would become the 11th 
largest market.116 Instead, just three weeks later, the combined market value
of all cryptocurrencies had dropped by more than 50% to just under $360 
106. Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, Bitcoin Bounces Back from Three-Month Low in Vola-
tile Trade, REUTERS (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-markets-bitcoin/
bitcoin-bounces-back-from-three-month-low-in-volatile-trade-idUSKBN1FQ0ZK; Evelyn 
Chang, Bitcoin Continues To Tumble, Briefly Breaking Below $6000, CNBC (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/05/bitcoin-drops-more-than-14-percent-to-below-7000.html.
107. Arjun Kharpal, Cryptocurrency Market Could Hit $1 Trillion This Year with 
Bitcoin Surging to $50,000, Experts Say, CNBC (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/
02/07/bitcoin-price-could-hit-50000-this-year-experts-say.html.
108. Aetna Inc Market Cap, YCHARTS, https://ycharts.com/companies/AET/market_cap
(last visited Oct. 28, 2018).
109. Bitcoin Core (BTC) Price, BITCOIN.COM, https://charts.bitcoin.com/btc/chart/ price 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2018).
110. See Jason Murdock, Bitcoin Price: ‘More Blood to Come’ as Cryptocurrency 
Crashes Below $6000, NEWSWEEK (June 29, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/bitcoin-
price-more-blood-come-cryptocurrency-falls-below-6000-1000867.
111. Jeff J. Roberts, Five Big Bitcoin Crashes: What We Learned, FORTUNE (Sept. 18, 
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/18/bitcoin-crash-history/.
112. Id.
113. Shell supra note 105. For a tour of bitcoin’s early wild swings in valuation, see 
Timothy Lee, An Illustrated History of Bitcoin Crashes, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2013), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2013/04/11/an-illustrated-history-of-bitcoin-crashes/
#6c6062d44039.
114. Vitalik Buterin, Crypto, Blockchain Space Won’t See ‘1,000-Times Growth’ Again,
COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 9, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/vitalik-buterin-crypto-
blockchain-space-wont-see-1-000-times-growth-again. For perspective, that is larger than the 
GDP of the Netherlands. See GDP: All Countries and Economies, THE WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2016&start=2016&view=
bar&year_high_desc=true (last visited Oct. 28, 2018).
115. Bloomberg, How Fundstrat’s Tom Lee Pegs a Value on Bitcoin, YOUTUBE (Jan. 
24, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=otf3-x0pKhQ.
116. Id.
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billion.117 Six months later, that number had fallen another 35% to $236 bil-
lion, and in December 2018 the combined market value dipped to around 
$100 billion.118 Ethereum, the second largest cryptocurrency, rose to $1302 
in January 2018, before plummeting to $697.86 in early February,119 $412 
by late June,120 and dropping well below $300 in August 2018.121 In early 
September, Ethereum dropped below $200,122 and as this article goes to 
print in December 2018, the price hovers around $90.123 The volatility 
prompted Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin to tweet a warning that “cryp-
tocurrencies are still a new and hyper-volatile asset class, and could drop to 
near zero at any time.”124 Forbes routinely includes an editor’s note in its 
cryptocurrency articles stating “Investing in cryptocoins or tokens is highly 
speculative and the market is largely unregulated. Anyone considering it 
should be prepared to lose their entire investment.”125 Nevertheless, crypto-
currency’s most avid promoters routinely proclaim a new bull market that 
will see cryptocurrencies cross $1 trillion in valuation.126
IV.  Layers of Trust Embedded in Cryptocurrencies
One of the key blockchain buzzwords is “trustless.” It is not uncommon 
for those associated with cryptocurrency to claim that the blockchain re-
places trust.127 For many, the entire point of using a blockchain-based digital 
currency is to eliminate the need to trust actors with control over one’s
117. See Total Market Capitalization, supra note 98. For perspective, this figure is 
slightly smaller than the GDP of the United Arab Emirates. See GDP: All Countries and 
Economies, supra note 114.
118. See Total Market Capitalization, supra note 98.
119. Ether/USD Coinbase, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/quotes/
?symbol=ETH.CB%3D (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
120. Ethereum Price, COINDESK (June 29, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-
price/.
121. Ethereum Price, COINDESK (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-
price/.
122. Nick Chong, Crypto Markets Continue Lower: ETH Falls Below $200, BTC at 
$6150, ETHEREUM WORLD NEWS (Sept. 8, 2018), https://ethereumworldnews.com/crypto-
market-lower-eth-200-btc-6150/.
123. Ethereum Price, COINDESK (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-
price/.
124. Vitalik Buterin (@VitalikButerin), TWITTER (Feb. 17, 2018, 7:25 AM), https://
twitter.com/VitalikButerin/status/964838207215955969.
125. See, e.g., Jesse Damiani, Crypto Watch: Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Ripple Prices Con-
tinue to Plummet. Is the Bottom in Sight?, FORBES (June 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/jessedamiani/2018/06/29/crypto-watch-bitcoin-ethereum-and-ripple-prices-continue-to-
plummet-is-the-bottom-in-sight/#7613270c2e31.
126. Kharpal, supra note 107.
127. See, e.g., Nomad Wallet, Blockchain—Believe in Cryptographic Proof Instead of 
Trust, https://digitalnomad.community/believe-in-cryptographic-proof-instead-of-trust/;
CRYPTOBITCLUB, https://cryptobitclub.co/.
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wealth and how it may be used. More nuanced versions of this claim assert 
that “Blockchains don’t actually eliminate trust. What they do is minimize
the amount of trust required from any single actor in the system.” 128
When cryptocurrency advocates say that the blockchain replaces trust, 
what they really mean is that making a transaction on the blockchain in-
volves shifting the trust that would otherwise repose in a specific trusted in-
termediary, like a bank, and instead placing that trust in the underlying 
blockchain system. The parties to such a transaction thus trust the block-
chain to do the things that a bank would do in a more conventional transac-
tion: to facilitate the transfer, to ensure sender authenticity, and to vouch for 
the validity of the currency exchanged. The blockchain purports to do this 
via cryptography (which validates sender authenticity) and a consensus 
mechanism which provides a probabilistic guarantee that transactions are 
valid.129 As one blockchain expert stated: “when we transact with one anoth-
er on the blockchain, we are anchoring our trust in the miners. . . .”130 Be-
cause the blockchain assumes the nodes act independently and do not trust 
each other, each node demands proof that a transaction occurred. The theory 
is that whatever emerges from that decentralized, multi-directional proof 
demand can be trusted to be “true.”131
Despite the extravagant rhetoric about trustless interactions, multiple 
layers of trust are built into cryptocurrencies.132 With regard to the block-
chain itself, users are 1) trusting developers to build secure software,133 2) 
trusting miners not to collude or attack the blockchain,134 and 3) trusting the 
wider cryptocurrency governance process not to approve a malicious hard-
fork.135 With regard to using the currency, users are trusting 1) that markets 
128. See Preethi Kasireddy, ELI5: What Do We Mean by “Blockchains are Trustless,”
MEDIUM (Feb. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/@preethikasireddy/eli5-what-do-we-mean-by-
blockchains-are-trustless-aa420635d5f6.
129. See Nakamoto, supra note 17.
130. Kasireddy, supra note 128.
131. See Nakamoto, supra note 17 at 3 (“If a majority of CPU power is controlled by 
honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the fastest and outpace any competing chains.”).
132. See Hashib Qureshi, Why Bitcoin is Not Trustless, HACKERNOON (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://hackernoon.com/bitcoin-is-not-trustless-350ba0060fc9.
133. For a discussion of bugs that called off the SegWit2x rollout, see Jimmy Song, 
SegWit2x Bugs Explained, BITCOIN TECH TALK (Nov. 20, 2017), https://bitcointechtalk.com/
segwit2x-bugs-explained-8e0c286124bc (noting that the bugs could have allowed double-
spending).
134. See Kwon et al., Be Selfish and Avoid Dilemmas: Fork-After-Withholding Attacks 
on Bitcoin, MORNING PAPER (Dec. 7, 2017), https://blog.acolyer.org/2017/12/07/be-selfish-
and-avoid-dilemmas-fork-after-withholding-attacks-on-bitcoin/.
135. See infra pp. 33-38. For an in-depth consideration of DAOs as business entities, see 
generally Carla L. Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2018).
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are not being manipulated,136 2) that wallets will generate secure keys,137 and 
3) that trading platforms are using best security practices.138 That is an awful 
lot of trust for a trustless system. The biggest differences with more conven-
tional markets are that most of this trust is unspoken, and often unrealized 
by participants, and there is virtually no legal backstop should one or more 
of these trusts be broken.
A. Trusting the Blockchain Itself
The combination of difficulty in replacing a block and the distributed 
copies of the chain are what prompt claims about the immutability139 and re-
liability of the blockchain. However, this scenario also gives rise to a major 
limiting factor: the blockchain’s current inability to scale.140 Each full node 
has an individual copy of the entire blockchain. That means that the block-
chain as a whole is limited by the processing capacity of each single node. 
As the blockchain grows, the power needed to run a full node increases 
dramatically and it can take many hours to process a blockchain transaction. 
Under ordinary circumstances, confirmation takes 1-2 hours.141 However, as 
traffic increases, processing times follow suit. For example, at the height of 
the December 2017 bitcoin frenzy, processing times rose from an average of 
78 minutes to 1188 minutes (nearly 20 hours!).142 As processing time shot 
up, fees increased as well. At the peak, average transaction fees topped $55 
136. For a description of market manipulation, see J.P. Buntinx, Who is Spoofy and How 
is He Manipulating Bitcoin’s Price?, NULLTX (Aug. 7, 2017), https://nulltx.com/who-is-
spoofy/.
137. See Alex Hern, Bitcoin App Issues Critical Update After Rare Bug Leads to Total 
Crypto Breakdown, GUARDIAN (June 1, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2015/jun/01/bitcoin-app-critical-update-bug-crypto-breakdown.
138. See, e.g., Makiko Yamazaki, Tokyo-based Cryptocurrency Exchange Hacked, Los-
ing $530 million: NHK, REUTERS (Jan. 26 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-
cryptocurrency/tokyo-based-cryptocurrency-exchange-hacked-losing-530-million-nhk-
idUSKBN1FF29C; Reuters, Bitcoin Worth $72M Was Stolen in Bitfinex Exchange Hack in 
Hong Kong, FORTUNE (Aug. 3, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/03/bitcoin-stolen-bitfinex-
hack-hong-kong/; Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox Bitcoin’s $460 Million Dis-
aster, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/.
139. See, e.g., Oscar L. Serrano, Is the Blockchain Really Immutable?, BLOCKCHAIN 
REVOLUTION (July 5, 2017), https://www.bbva.com/en/blockchain-really-immutable/.
140. Preethi Kasireddy, Blockchains Don’t Scale. Not Today, at Least. But There’s
Hope, HACKERNOON (Aug. 23, 2017), https://hackernoon.com/blockchains-dont-scale-not-
today-at-least-but-there-s-hope-2cb43946551a. The explanation in the rest of this paragraph is 
loosely based on Kasireddy’s article.
141. Alex Lielacher, How Long Should My Bitcoin Transaction Take?, BITCOIN MKT. J.
(July 6, 2017), https://www.bitcoinmarketjournal.com/how-long-bitcoin-transactions/.
142. Ryan Browne, Big Transaction Fees are a Problem for Bitcoin - But There Could 
Be a Solution, CNBC (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/19/big-transactions-
fees-are-a-problem-for-bitcoin.html.
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dollars per transaction.143 Indeed, Bitcoin Marketing Journal, the self-
proclaimed “most trusted name in new finance,” cautions, in bold, that 
“[t]he higher the fee you include with your transaction, the more likely it 
will be prioritized by bitcoin network participants, and the sooner it will be 
processed.”144 The problems got so bad that in January 2018, the North 
American Bitcoin Conference to refuse to accept cryptocurrency as pay-
ment, citing high fees and slow processing times.145
Because the system is decentralized, merely adding more nodes, unlike 
to the go-to solution of adding more servers in a traditional, centralized da-
tabase, will not shorten processing time. Moreover, electricity demands as-
sociated with the Bitcoin blockchain alone has already reached unsustaina-
ble levels.146 It seems clear that cryptocurrency proponents will have to 
address this complicated question and devise a mechanism that can both 
limit the number of nodes needed to validate each transaction while simul-
taneously maintaining the overall network trust that each transaction is val-
id. For that to happen, nodes will have to trust that blocks they did not vali-
date are nevertheless secure.147
While the future of the blockchain will probably have to involve full 
nodes trusting each other in some fashion, the blockchain in its current state 
already explicitly incorporates trust in two very important respects. First, 
many cryptocurrency transactions use a simplified verification system, which 
143. Bitcoin Avg. Transaction Fee Historical Chart, BIT INFO CHARTS (Oct. 27, 2018), 
https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/bitcoin-transactionfees.html. Fees have fallen dramati-
cally since then, but still average over $2.00 per transaction. This fee, paid by the transaction 
participants, is on top of the processing fee that merchants pay to bitcoin payment processers. 
Those merchant fees are frequently touted as much lower than credit card processing fees.
144. Lielacher, supra note 141.
145. Rob Price, A Major Bitcoin Conference is No Longer Accepting Bitcoin Payments 
Because the Fees and Lag Have Gotten So Bad, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 10, 2018), http://
www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-conference-stops-accepting-bitcoin-network-fees-
congestion-2018-1.
146. Bitcoin’s energy footprint is already massive and far in excess of its ascribed value. 
Producing Bitcoin currently consumes more energy on a daily basis than the entire state of 
New York. Energy Efficiency of Blockchain and Similar Technologies: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Arvind Narayanan, Asso-
ciate Professor, Princeton University), https://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/
serve?File_id=8A1CECD1-157C-45D4-A1AB-B894E913737D. In 2017, Bitcoin mining con-
sumed 54.2 TWh of energy, as much as the entire country of Bangladesh. Bitcoin Energy 
Consumption Index, DIGICONOMIST (Oct. 22, 2018), https://digiconomist.net/bitcoin-energy-
consumption; see also Timothy B. Lee, Bitcoin’s Insane Energy Consumption Explained,
ARSTECHNICA (Dec. 6, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/12/bitcoins-insane-
energy-consumption-explained/.
147. Some speculate that the process will eventually become so unwieldy that it will 
only be feasible for a few nodes to process a block—at which point, the trust based on decen-
tralized, unanimous consensus will be called into question. Nodes will have to trust that 
blocks they did not validate. There are multiple proposed solutions to this conundrum that 
involve various verification methods. See, e.g., Kassireddy, supra note 128, for an explanation 
of some of the possible solutions.
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involves trusting full nodes. Second, blockchain users trust that built-in eco-
nomic games will keep the miners honest.
1. Most Cryptocurrency Users Wind Up Trusting Individual Nodes
When Alice wants to pay Bob with Bitcoin or an altcoin, she broadcasts 
the transaction to all of the nodes that comprise the peer-to-peer network for 
the cryptocurrency in question.148 Those nodes verify the block and the 
transactions within the block and then relay that block to other nodes. In 
theory, every node verifies every block by verifying every transaction with-
in that block, before relaying that block to another node.149 The transaction 
is considered confirmed when enough new blocks have been added to the 
chain on top of the particular block encoding that transaction. Because this 
consensus mechanism creates a single, global ledger, each node will use the 
identical agreed-upon history as it verifies the validity of any new block or 
transaction. This decentralized verification against an identical ledger is the 
source of cryptocurrency’s much heralded security against hacking and 
double-spending. Every bitcoin is identifiable, allowing the payment system 
to confirm precisely which bitcoins are being sent, and from where, before 
the transaction is logged in the distributed ledger. Because each coin can on-
ly be in one place at a time, this system offers protection from an unscrupu-
lous coin owner trying to game the system by spending the same coin twice. 
One can think of the blockchain as a decentralized, publicly accessible, vir-
tual paper trail documenting the history of each coin—its past and current 
ownership and the journey the coin has taken from owner to owner.150 The 
idea is that this decentralized process prevents forgery or double-spending, 
without the need for a trusted third party. As a result, “the majority of the 
participants on the network get to decide what version of the blockchain 
represents the truth.”151
Most cryptocurrency participants do not run a full node (there are only 
about 10,000 full nodes in existence).152 Instead, many cryptocurrency hold-
ers rely on so-called light nodes (also called light wallets), which use a sim-
plified payment verification system (SPV). These SPV nodes connect with 
148. Miners are full nodes, but full nodes need not be miners. Miners can create and 
propose blocks to the blockchain, but it is full nodes that determine the consensus for which 
blocks will be added to the blockchain.
149. See Danny Hamilton, Difference Between Miners and Nodes, BITCOIN FORUM
(Dec. 31, 2016), https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1734235.0.
150. Catherine M. Christopher, The Bridging Model: Exploring the Roles of Trust and 
Enforcement in Banking, Bitcoin and Blockchain, 17 NEV. L.J. 139, 144-45 (2016).
151. Jimi S., Blockchain: How a 51% Attack Works (Double Spend Attack), MEDIUM:
COINMONKS (May 5, 2018), https://blog.goodaudience.com/what-is-a-51-attack-or-double-
spend-attack-aa108db63474.
152. See Jameson Lopp, Bitcoin Nodes: How Many is Enough?, MEDIUM (June 7, 
2014), https://medium.com/@lopp/bitcoin-nodes-how-many-is-enough-9b8e8f6fd2cf.
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one or more full nodes and ask that a cryptocurrency transaction be included 
in a block. The SPV wallet then receives confirmation from the full node that 
the transaction was included in a block, and that the block is part of a 
chain.153 The SPV system trusts that a transaction followed by an adequate 
number of blocks would be too costly to forge. So long as a transaction is 
included in a block and that block is incorporated into a chain that is subse-
quently built upon, SPV wallets will accept the transactions as valid without 
checking further.154 That means that a light wallet does not actually verify 
that the transaction was included in the correct chain—the one that is the sin-
gle, agreed-upon history of all transactions.155 Instead, the light nodes (and 
hence its user) trust one or more full nodes to verify transactions for them.156
SPV wallets are thus potentially at the mercy of rogue nodes, or even 
sloppy ones. Indeed, in July 2015, after a Bitcoin system upgrade, this vul-
nerability resulted in a crisis.157 Despite a consensus to upgrade to a new 
process, roughly half the network was mining using the old protocol, which 
meant they were not fully vetting blocks.158 Some of these miners produced 
invalid blocks that were accepted by SPV and old versions of the network 
software, while being rejected by the updated portion of the network. The 
invalid blocks showed transaction confirmations that were not real. There 
were at least three forks, one of which added six blocks before the valid 
chain reasserted itself.159 SPV wallets were advised to wait for an additional 
153. See Bisade Asolo, Full Node and Lighweight Node, MYCRYPTOPEDIA (Nov. 1, 
2018), https://www.mycryptopedia.com/full-node-lightweight-node/. For a good description 
of the difference between light nodes and full nodes, see for example, AdminFrog, What Are 
Full Nodes and Light Nodes of the Bitcoin BlockChain, COIN FROG (Jan. 14, 2018), 
https://coinfrog.io/full-nodes-light-nodes/.
154. Many assert that SPV nodes are just as secure as full nodes. See, e.g., Jonald 
Fyookball, Why Every Bitcoin User Should Understand “SPV Security,” MEDIUM (May 28, 
2017), https://medium.com/@jonaldfyookball/why-every-bitcoin-user-should-understand-spv-
security-520d1d45e0b9.
155. See infra p. 24, 26-27, 29-33. For an explanation of how a chain can be forked into 
two branches and then pruned, see Eyal & Sirer, supra note 87 (describing selfish mining). 
Transactions included in a pruned block are ignored, but can be resubmitted for processing. In 
the interim however, the possibility of double-spending arises.
156. Pwuille, Comment to Full Node Question, REDDIT (July 29, 2015, 7:24 AM), 
https://www.reddit.com/r/BitcoinBeginners/comments/3eq3y7/full_node_question/ctk4lnd/
(“SPV nodes . . . place a blind trust in the majority of miners, without checking validity of the 
blockchain they produce. It still requires a majority of miners to mislead an SPV node, but the 
can make it believe anything (including “You received 10000000 BTC!”)”).
157. See Some Miners Generating Invalid Blocks, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/alert/
2015-07-04-spv-mining (last updated July 15, 2018).
158. See id. The new rule was called BIP66. It was intended to remove OpenSSL from 
the consensus code for signature verification. See generally Bip-0066.mediawiki, GITHUB, 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0066.mediawiki (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
159. See Some Miners Generating Invalid Blocks, supra note 157.
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thirty confirmations before assuming that their transactions had been cor-
rectly processed.160
Notice, this situation did not involve an invidious attack but sloppy exe-
cution of a consensus protocol upgrade. It took over an hour before it be-
came clear which blockchain fork was growing longer, and therefore was 
the more valid chain. Users may have been surprised to discover that the 
fate of their crypto assets on the trustless blockchain hinged not on the 
much-touted unhackable cryptography but on software updates vulnerable 
to usual human error or laziness.
To avoid such a situation, the Bitcoin Developers Guide counsels that 
“block and transaction data should not be relied upon if it comes from a 
node that apparently isn’t using the current consensus rules.”161 It advises 
SPV clients162 to connect to several full nodes and ensure they are all “on the 
same chain with the same block height,163 plus or minus several blocks to 
account for transmission delays and stale blocks.”164 It goes on to caution 
that if there is a divergence, it is up to the SPV clients to disconnect from 
nodes with weaker chains. Notice the layers of trust built into the transac-
tions—that nodes are using appropriate software, that nodes are validly pro-
cessing transactions, and that SPV wallets are monitoring the behavior of 
the full nodes they are trusting.
This vulnerability of light wallets is not a surprise. Satoshi Nakamoto 
himself noted that SPV verification “is reliable as long as honest nodes con-
trol the network, but is more vulnerable by an attacker . . . [t]he simplified 
method can be fooled by an attacker’s fabricated transactions . . .”165 Bitcoin 
developer Peter Todd puts it more bluntly, “a full node can lie about a lot of 
things to an SPV client and they’ll be none the wiser.”166 In Todd’s own 
160. Id.
161. Blockchain Guide, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/developer-guide#detecting-forks 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
162. SPV stands for “simplified payment verification.” It is a method for verifying 
transactions without downloading the entire blockchain.
163. An alert after the July 2015 fork advised SPV wallet users to wait until 30 blocks 
have been added to the chain before relying on a transaction confirmation. Some Miners Gen-
erating Invalid Blocks, supra note 157. At an average pace of 10 minutes per block, that 
would be a wait of 5 hours. See Alex Lielacher, How Long Should My Bitcoin Transaction 
Take?, BITCOIN MKT. J. (July 6, 2017), https://www.bitcoinmarketjournal.com/how-long-
bitcoin-transactions/. The more usual wait was for six blocks, or an hour wait.
164. Blockchain Guide, supra note 161.
165. Nakamoto, supra note 17, at 5.
166. PeterTodd, Comment to Bitnodes Recently Updated Their Node Counter Crawling 
Algorithm - Apparently the Old One Was Off by an Order of Magnitude, REDDIT (Mar. 15, 
2014, 2:30 PM), https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/20hsql/bitnodes_ecently_
updated_their_node_counter/cg3d1qy/?context=3. The Bitcoin wiki makes this point as well. 
See Lightweight Node, BITCOIN WIKI (last edited Jan. 15, 2018), https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/
Lightweight_node.
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terms, using a light wallet is “just outsourc[ing] your trust to others.”167
Most of the people buying and selling cryptocurrency probably have no idea 
of the levels of trust they are placing in nameless, faceless full nodes. After 
all, they have been repeatedly assured that the blockchain replaces trust.
2. The Blockchain’s Integrity Depends on the Honesty of Miners
Blockchains rely heavily on economic games that are intended to incen-
tivize actors to cooperate. When the games work, the integrity of the block-
chain is maintained. However, from the genesis block onward, it has been 
clear that the blockchain is secure only so long as honest miners control 
more computational power than a group of cooperating attackers.168 The 
main caveat to the blockchain’s probabilistic guarantee of validity is that it 
assumes no single miner controls a majority of the network. If a single min-
er or pool of miners were to control 51% of the nodes, (a so-called 51% at-
tack) the system would cease to be decentralized. At that point, the majority 
miner could unilaterally control which blocks are added to the blockchain, 
enabling him/her to double-spend at will. Of course, theoretical vulnerabil-
ity is not the same as an actual threat in the real world.169 From time to time, 
scholars float the concern that a government might engage in a 51% attack 
in order to “destroy the Bitcoin economy in order to achieve utility outside 
the Bitcoin economy.”170
The possibility of a 51% attack used to be considered more theoretical 
than actual, even though in 2016 there was a 51% attack against a smaller 
Ethereum chain.171 Then, in the summer of 2018, at least five cryptocurren-
cies were subject to 51% attacks within the space of a single month.172 The 
compromised currencies included: Zencash, Monacoin, Bitcoin gold, Verge 
and Litecoin.173 There is even a website projecting the cost of acquiring the 
167. PeterTodd, supra note 166.
168. Nakamoto, supra note 17, at 3.
169. For example, while it is theoretically possible to crack the encryption at the core of 
the blockchain, that risk is so improbable that it can safely be dismissed. Natalie Fratto, Com-
mentary: This New Technology Will Crack the Blockchain Like an Egg, FORTUNE (Jan. 31, 
2018), http://fortune.com/2018/01/31/commentary-this-new-technology-will-crack-the-
blockchain-like-an-egg/.
170. Joshua A. Kroll et al., The Economics of Bitcoin Mining or Bitcoin in the Presence 
of Adversaries 1, 13 (2013), http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2013/papers/
KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf.
171. See Rocky, 51% Crew Extorts and Hijacks Blockchains for Ransom, CRYPTO 
HUSTLE (Sept. 3, 2016), https://cryptohustle.com/51-attack-crew-extorts-and-hijacks-
blockchains-for-ransom.
172. Alyssa Hertig, Blockchain’s Once Feared 51% Attack is Now Becoming Regular,
COINDESK (June 8, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/blockchains-feared-51-attack-now-
becoming-regular/.
173. Id.
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mining power to enact a 51% attack on various cryptocurrencies.174 To in-
tentionally attack the Bitcoin blockchain in this fashion would require sig-
nificant hashing power in order to control a majority of nodes. However, 
even Bitcoin has come close to this level of consolidation of mining power. 
In 2014, one mining pool, Ghash.io controlled around 50% of mining on the 
bitcoin blockchain.175 In a statement that sounded perilously like “you can 
trust us,” the CIO of the company hastened to assure the bitcoin community 
that “[w]e would never harm the community.”176 At the time of this writing, 
four mining pools, BTC.com, Antpool, BTC.Top, and Via.BTC together
control roughly 70% of the bitcoin mining network.177 BTC.com, which 
alone controls 25% of the network,178 and Antpool, which controls 16% are 
both projects of the same China-based company, Bitman.179 Bitman’s
founder Jihan Wu was a significant force behind the hard fork that created 
Bitcoin Cash.180 The possibility that these nodes could collude to launch a 
51% attack certainly exists. Overall, Chinese mining pools dominate bitcoin 
mining, controlling up to 80% of the network.181 For a system that depends 
on decentralization for validity, that seems remarkably centralized.182
However, even putting aside the prospect of a 51% attack, there are 
multiple, profitable ways for miners to game the verification system and un-
dermine the validity of the chain. A few of the best-known techniques are 
174. PoW 51% Attack Cost, CRYPTO51, https://www.crypto51.app/ (last visited Nov. 23, 
2018).
175. Roop Gill, CEX.IO Slow to Respond as Fears of a 51% Attach Spread, COINDESK
(June 13, 2014), https://www.coindesk.com/cex-io-response-fears-of-51-attack-spread/.
176. Id.
177. Hashrate Distribution, BLOCKCHAIN, https://blockchain.info/pools?timespan=
4days (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
178. Id.
179. Jacob Donelly, One of Bitcoin’s Largest Miners Is Launching a Second Pool,
COINDESK (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/bitmain-bitcoin-mining-launch-
second-mining-pool/. To get a sense of the scale of this operation, Bitman has 25,000 special-
ized machines continuously mining bitcoin. Joshua Althauser, Jihan Wu of Bitman Confident 
that Bitcoin Will Be Valued at $100,000 in Five Years, COINTELEGRAPH (Aug. 26, 2017), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/jihan-wu-of-bitmain-confident-that-bitcoin-will-be-valued-
100000-in-5-years.
180. Darryn Pollock, Bitmans Mining Monopoly Compromises Bitcoin’s Decentralized 
Nature, COINTELEGRAPH (Aug. 30, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/bitmains-mining-
monopoly-compromises-bitcoins-decentralized-nature.
181. This may be changing.  In 2018, China has cracked down on cryptocurrency, driv-
ing miners elsewhere. For example, Bitman has moved to Inner Mongolia. Rakesh Sharma,
China Intensifies Crackdown on Bitcoin Mining, INVESTOPIA (Jan. 11, 2018, 5:05 PM), 
https://www.investopedia.com/news/china-intensifies-crackdown-bitcoin-mining/.
182. In general, Bitcoin holdings are astonishingly consolidated, with 95% of the wealth 
held by 4% of the owners. See This Chart Reveals the Centralization of Bitcoin Wealth, HOW 
MUCH (Sept. 12, 2017), https://howmuch.net/articles/bitcoin-wealth-distribution. Forbes re-
ports that 94% of Bitcoin wealth is held by men. Jackie Lam, Where Are the Women on the 
Blockchain Network?, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lamjackie/2017/
12/10/where-are-the-women-in-the-blockchain-network/#23ee1a2a530a.
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Sybil attacks,183 Block Withholding and Selfish Mining attacks, 184 and 
Fork After Withholding attacks.185 These are maneuvers miners can use ei-
ther to permit double-spending or to increase their share of the mining re-
wards at the expense of other miners. All of these attacks involve gaming 
the consensus mechanism for profit or to inflict harm. Moreover, these at-
tacks can occur singly or in combination with a 51% attack.
These attacks are not merely hypothetical. At least one Block Withhold-
ing attack has been documented,186 and scholars assert that the only defense 
against this attack is for mining pool managers to work with miners they 
know personally and trust.187 Fork after Withholding attacks have been de-
scribed by scholars as “always profitable” and “difficult to guard against.”188
Selfish Mining had traditionally been considered impractical because it was 
assumed that it required control of a majority of the network nodes. Howev-
183. Sybil attacks involve copying nodes to give the appearance that there are many dif-
ferent nodes verifying a transaction, when in fact all those pseudo-participants are really con-
trolled by the same actor. Light wallets are particularly vulnerable to Sybil attacks. Moshe 
Babaioff, et al., On Bitcoin and Red Balloons, 10 ACM SIGECOM EXCHANGES 5, 7 (2011), 
http://www.sigecom.org/exchanges/volume_10/3/BABAIOFF.pdf.
184. Both Block Withholding and selfish mining involve withholding work. A selfish 
mining attack involves not immediately releasing a block but instead withholding it in an at-
tempt to find a second or third block for the new, secret chain. If the miner does find a second 
block before the network has found the first, then it can work even farther ahead while the rest 
of the network pursues the wrong fork. As soon as a new block is found, the withholding min-
er can release its blocks. As the longer chain, the newly released blocks would immediately 
become the most valid chain. A miner can use withholding to double-spend or to undermine 
the validity of a mining pool’s payment algorithm. See Eyal & Sirer, supra note 87 (describ-
ing a selfish mining attack); but see Nicholas T. Courtois & Lear Bahack, On Subversive Min-
er Strategies and Block Withholding Attacks in Bitcoin Digital Currency, ARXIV:1402.171 1, 
6 (Dec. 2, 2014), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1402.1718/ (calling the selfish assumptions into ques-
tion). See also Deepak K. Tosh, et al., Security Implications of Blockchain Cloud with Analy-
sis of Block Withholding Attack, IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y 458, 461-62 (2017), https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/317182715_Security_Implications_of_Blockchain_Cloud_with_
Analysis_of_Block_Withholding_Attack.
185. A fork after withholding combines a block withholding attack with a selfish mining 
attack. Yujin Kwon, et al., Be Selfish and Avoid Dilemmas: Fork After Withholding (FAW) 
Attacks on Bitcoin, ARXIV:1708.09790 1 (Aug. 31, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/
1708.09790.pdf.
186. The Block Withholding Attack occurred in the Eligius mining pool and reportedly 
cost the pool 300 Bitcoin. See Wizkid057, Eligius: 0% Fee BTC, 105% PPS NMC, No regis-
tration, CPPSRB, BITCOIN FORUM (June 13, 2014, 02:19:01 AM), https://bitcointalk.org/
?topic=441465.msg7282674. The pool’s response was to assure mining pool participants that 
any changes to the payment algorithms required the signatures of both Eligius pool founders, 
plus a disinterested third party. This announcement sought to leverage trust in the Eligius pool 
founders into trust in the validity of the mining pool payment algorithm.
187. Courtois & Bahack, supra note 184, at IX-A.
188. Kwon, supra note 185, at 3. Although this paper modeled the Fork After Withhold-
ing attack in bitcoin, the authors assert that other cryptocurrencies including Ethereum and 
Litecoin are also vulnerable.
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er, recent research shows how such an attack could be successful even with-
out controlling 51% of the network.189
The lesson from this should be that rhetoric about the trustless block-
chain may have been overblown. From the earliest inception of cryptocur-
rency, it has been clear that the validity of the blockchain depends on there 
being sufficient honest miners to validate each block. If enough miners 
cease or reduce their operations, the blockchain becomes vulnerable. For a 
finite system, this dependence on miners poses a potential problem. Rough-
ly 80% of the Bitcoin that will ever exist have already been mined.190 Cur-
rent estimates are that the last Bitcoin will be mined in 2140.191 What will 
happen at that date adds uncertainty to Bitcoin.192 Miners will still be needed 
to secure the integrity of the blockchain but will no longer obtain prizes for 
mining blocks. The system assumes (trusts?) that miners will continue to 
maintain the system to collect transaction fees.193 Yet, once all the Bitcoin 
are mined, there will be no block reward. Thus mining will be less lucrative. 
This is also true on a smaller scale every time the value of Bitcoin falls. 
Since miners are paid in the cryptocurrency, any lowering of Bitcoin’s value 
makes mining less lucrative, decreasing the incentive to mine. At some 
point this potentially becomes a death spiral, where the economic incentive 
for mining is not adequate to keep a sufficiently dispersed mining pool in 
place.194
Finally, it is worth noting that in contrast with cryptocurrency software 
developers, who tend to be well-known and trusted (that word again) public 
figures, miners are “an obscure group of anonymous people organized into a 
handful of pools.”195 Participants place a great deal of trust in nameless, 
faceless miners, and in the bitcoin incentive system that purports to align 
miner interests with those engaged in bitcoin transactions. Most cryptocur-
rency participants do not realize they are trusting miners in this fashion. In-
stead, they probably accept the oft-repeated assertions that the blockchain 
189. Kevin Liao & Jonathan Katz, Incentivizing Double-Spend Collusion in Bitcoin, in
FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY BITCOIN WORKSHOP (2017), https://www.cs.umd.edu/~gasarch/
reupapers/katzbitcoin16.pdf (describing a so-called ‘whale’ attack that could feasibly permit 
double-spending on the blockchain).
190. See BITCOIN BLOCK REWARD HALVING COUNTDOWN, supra note 84.
191. What Happens When All 21,000,000 Have Been Mined, CRYPTOCOINMASTERY
(Oct. 21, 2017), https://cryptocoinmastery.com/what-happens-when-all-bitcoins-have-been-
mined/.
192. Evan Faggart, What Happens to Bitcoin Miners When All Coins are Mined, (Aug. 
15, 2015), https://news.bitcoin.com/what-happens-bitcoin-miners-all-coins-mined/.
193. See Comment How Much Will Transaction Fees Eventually Be, STACK EXCHANGE
(Sept. 11, 2011, 11:02 PM) (detailing the possibilities and vulnerabilities of Bitcoin exchang-
es), https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/876/how-much-will-transaction-fees-
eventually-be/895#895.
194. Kroll et al., supra note 170.
195. Courtois & Bahack, supra note 184, at I-A.
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cannot be hacked196 as a proxy for a system that does not place their interests 
in jeopardy. Thus we see a slew of articles unironically asking questions 
like “Why do People Trust Bitcoin.”197 These articles generally wind up ex-
plaining why Bitcoin, and cryptocurrency more generally, is trustworthy. 
Indeed, one commenter summed it up by saying “bitcoin is trust.”198 For a 
purportedly trustless technology, this claim is staggering.
B. Trusting the Collective Governance Process
At the same time that transactions require trust in the blockchain itself 
and in miners as a group, maintaining the blockchain system requires an ad-
ditional kind of trust—trust in the integrity of the collective decision-
making process that governs the blockchain. The need for consensus among 
the validating nodes is touted as the blockchain’s insurance of validity.199
Yet what happens when the consensus protocol is changed? If the changes 
are popular, the entire community adopts them. The old chain still exists, 
but all the users have migrated in unison to the new chain.200 This is the ide-
al version of a hard fork, and results in adoption of the new protocol without 
creating a permanent fork in the blockchain.
Where things get tricky is when the new protocol is not unanimously 
accepted. If the community does not agree on the hard fork update path, it 
can get “very, very bad.”201 When the interested parties (which include, at a 
minimum, developers, users, miners, investors) cannot agree on a solution, 
the outcome can jeopardize trust in the cryptocurrency. Each stakeholder is 
forced to choose a side of the dispute, and commit to one version of the con-
sensus protocol. This kind of hard fork, called a “contentious hard fork”
splits the path of the blockchain—creating two separate chains running par-
allel to each other. Some nodes mine and verify following the old protocol 
196. See e.g., BittBurger, Can the Blockchain Be Hacked, BITCOIN FORUM (Dec. 5, 
2013, 2:00AM), https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=358039.0. In most cases, virtually 
nothing is known about who the miners are, even their country of residence is unknown. 
Moreover, miners have a real incentive to hide—they have realized billions of dollars of prof-
its from mining, some or most of which is hidden from tax authorities.
197. Why Do People Trust Bitcoin?, BEST BITCOIN CASINOS, http://bitcoincasino.best/
why-do-people-trust-bitcoin/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
198. Tyler Willis, Bitcoin is Trust, BIG THINK (Dec. 7, 2013), http://bigthink.com/cue-
the-future/bitcoin-is-trust.
199. SIGRID SEIBOLD & GEORGE SAMMAN, CONSENSUS: IMMUTABLE AGREEMENT ON 
THE BLOCKCHAIN 3 (KPMG ed., 2016), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/
06/kpmg-blockchain-consensus-mechanism.pdf.
200. Hard forks change block acceptance rules in a fashion that make previously invalid 
blocks valid. Users relying on older versions of the protocol will not accept the new blocks. 
As a result, users of the old protocol will remain on their own blockchain indefinitely.
201. Tanzeel Akhtar, Understanding the Upcoming Ethereum Hard Fork, THESTREET
(Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.thestreet.com/story/14334000/1/understanding-the-upcoming-
ethereum-hard-fork.html (quoting Cyrus Younessi, the Digital Currencies Investment Analyst 
at Cumberland Mining in Chicago).
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and other nodes follow the new protocol. This situation creates permanently 
divergent chains—resulting in two distinct longest chains, both of which are 
considered valid by part of the network. Because the chains follow different 
validation rules, they are incompatible with each other. With no way to de-
termine which chain was “valid” there would no longer be a shared, unam-
biguous blockchain history that represents something users agree on as the 
“truth.” Users cannot send funds from one chain to the other because each 
chain uses a different, incompatible protocol.202
Experience on the Bitcoin blockchain underscores just how polarizing a 
contested hard fork can be, and highlights the role that trust plays in crypto-
currency more generally. In August 2017, the Bitcoin blockchain underwent 
the contentious hard fork that created Bitcoin Cash over a disagreement 
about how to handle congestion on the blockchain. A contentious fork is 
bad enough, but in this case, the circumstances surrounding the fork were 
rife with allegations of self-dealing and bad faith. As one commenter noted, 
the conflict “erode[d] trust within the community.”203 The commenter then 
went on to caution participants, seemingly without irony, that “[p]arties that 
don’t trust each other have a difficult time compromising and meeting pos-
sible future challenges.”204
The Bitcoin hard fork had its roots in the protocol’s size limit of 1 MB 
per block. As Bitcoin gained popularity, users poured into the system. The 
size limit, combined with the decentralized nature of the network, led to ma-
jor delays in processing transactions. Disagreement over how to respond to 
these delays split the Bitcoin community: specifically whether to increase 
the size of the blocks in the chain or make other operational changes to in-
crease speed of processing.205 A group of miners led by Bitman founder Ji-
han Wu206 (remember Bitman—the force behind two of the major mining 
pools) pushed aggressively for increasing the size of each block added to the 
202. The Differences Between Hard and Soft Forks, WEUSECOINS (Aug. 23, 2016), 
https://www.weusecoins.com/hard-fork-soft-fork-differences/.
203. David Dinkins, Opinion: Collapse of Bitcoin’s “New York Agreement” Would 
Have Long Term Consequences, COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 16, 2017), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/opinion-collapse-of-bitcoins-new-york-agreement-would-
have-long-term-consequences.
204. Id.
205. Because bitcoin blocks are 1MB in size and it takes 10 minutes to add a block, the 
chain can process only roughly 7 transactions per second. For comparison, Visa can process 
2000 transactions per second.  At peak times, bitcoin transactions can take hours to be filled. 
Blockchain Scaling: Why PoW Networks Can’t Scale, COINMONKS (Aug. 31, 2018), https://
medium.com/coinmonks/blockchain-scaling-30c9e1b7db1b.
206. Prableen Bajpai, Who is Jihan Wu and Does He Basically Control Bitcoin?,
INVESTOPEDIA (May 1, 2017), https://www.investopedia.com/news/who-jihan-wu-and-does-
he-basically-control-bitcoin-today/. Wu is a controversial figure because of allegations that he 
manipulated the cryptocurrency for his own gain. Jeff John Roberts, Does Bitcoin Have a 
Mining Monopoly Problem?, FORTUNE (Aug. 25, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/25/
bitcoin-mining/.
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blockchain from 1 MB to 2 MB.207 Others advocated a more permanent so-
lution in the form of a code called Segregated Witness (SegWit).208 This 
code separated the signatures from the transaction data in each block, then 
only counted the transaction data as subject to the 1 MB cap.
The debate over which solution to adopt raged on while the Bitcoin 
network got slower and slower. Finally a group of over 50 high profile 
companies met to resolve the situation, producing a compromise known as 
the New York Agreement.209 This agreement resolved the debate by agree-
ing to do both proposals—to increase speed by segregating transaction sig-
natures, and to subsequently increase in block size.210 The companies sign-
ing the agreement represented 83.25% of the computing power on the
bitcoin blockchain.211
It should have been simple.  As designed by Nakamoro, the miners de-
cide which code changes to accept. However, an entire economic ecosystem 
had grown up around the blockchain, and that ecosystem was not happy. 
Companies that provided cryptocurrency storage wallets aligned with the 
trading platforms to argue that the change should not proceed without sup-
port from an “economic majority” of the blockchain’s users.212 They offered 
an alternative proposal called BIP148, a user activated soft fork to comply 
with SegWit. This proposal would put blockchain users, rather than miners 
in the driver’s seat. The stated goal was to avoid forcing users to upgrade 
their software unnecessarily.213 But, what was really happening was a power 
struggle over who gets to make choices for the blockchain—the miners or 
the users. For example, the users proposed that “[u]sers that decide to en-
force the new rules will only follow blocks that conform to the existing 
rules which will in turn cause miners to activate SegWit.214 Their position 
was that the economic majority should signal support for the change, and 
the miners should follow along.215 The threat was that if miners did not fol-
low along with the user proposal, users would not recognize their coins as 
207. See Laura Shin, What Will Happen at the Time of the Bitcoin Hard Fork?, FORBES
(Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/10/31/what-will-happen-at-the-
time-of-the-bitcoin-hard-fork/#5ed3fddc337d.
208. This plan would increase processing speed by segregating transaction signatures 
(called “witnesses”, hence the name “Segwit”) from the blockchain. For an explanation of 
how Segwit works, see Kasireddy, supra note 140.
209. Digital Currency Group, Bitcoin Scaling Agreement at Consensus 2017, MEDIUM
(May 23, 2017), https://medium.com/@DCGco/bitcoin-scaling-agreement-at-consensus-2017-
133521fe9a77.
210. Id. SegWit supporters claimed their approach would save nearly 70% of the space 
in each block, and would thus be equivalent to a quadrupling of block size.
211. Id.
212. USAF Working Group, BIP148 & UASF FAQ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018), 
http://www.uasf.co/#bip148—uasf-faq.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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Bitcoin—making sale of those coins more difficult. Yet, if users did not up-
grade and the majority of the hash power switched to the new 2MB chain, 
there might not be enough miners to ensure the validity of the original 1MB 
blockchain. That would leave the original chain vulnerable to attack.216
These twin threats highlighted the possibility of a split between a majority 
of the miners and an “economic majority” of the wallets and platforms, rais-
ing the question of whose consensus mattered for blockchain governance.217
Despite the agreement, the group of miners led by Jihan Wu decided to 
opt out of the SegWit debate and increase the size of bitcoin blocks on their 
own.218 On August 1, 2017, they implemented a new consensus protocol that 
raised the block size from 1MB to 8 MB.219 There were now two protocols, 
one that recognized only 1 MB blocks as valid, and one that recognized 
8MB blocks. This resulted in two mutually incompatible chains—and thus a 
hard fork in the blockchain. Some miners stuck with the old protocol, while 
others moved to the new chain, resulting in two currencies: Bitcoin and 
Bitcoin Cash.220 Akin to how shares are distributed after a corporate spin-
off, Hodlers received one Bitcoin Cash for each Bitcoin they held on the 
day of the hard fork. Bitcoin Cash promoters claimed to be the true heir to 
Satoshi Nakamoto’s vision and thus the true Bitcoin.221 However, the market 
216. Id.
217. Another group of miners decided to opt out of this debate entirely. They created a 
hard fork on August 1, 2017 by altering the consensus protocol to create blocks that were 8 
MB rather than 1 MB.
218. Sudhir Khatwani, Bitcoin Cash (BCH) - A New Feather in Bitcoin’s Fork Cap,
COINSUTRA, https://coinsutra.com/bitcoin-cash-bch/ (last updated July 9, 2018).
219. Josiah Wilmoth, The First 8MB Bitcoin Cash Block Was Just Mined, CCN (Aug. 
17, 2017), https://www.ccn.com/first-8mb-bitcoin-cash-block-just-mined/.
220. In an interesting coda to this story, one year after the contentious fork that created 
Bitcoin Cash, the cryptocurrency appears on the verge of another contentious hard fork, this 
time over how to treat noncash transactions in addition to disagreements over block size. 
Bitcoin Cash Might Chain Split Fork As Tensions Rise with Jihan Wu Calling Craig Wright 
Fake Satoshi, TRUSTNODES (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.trustnodes.com/2018/08/21/
bitcoin-cash-might-chain-split-fork-tensions-rise-jihan-wu-calling-craig-wright-fake-satoshi. 
Noting that the platforms are “kingmakers in these sorts of situations,” TrustNodes unironical-
ly asks “Would any of them trust a Craig Wright chain?” Id. Another commenter sees the ma-
jor mining pools as the key decisionmakers. Jeff Benson, The Potential Bitcoin Cash Hard 
Fork, Explained, ETHNEWS (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.ethnews.com/the-potential-bitcoin-
cash-hard-fork-explained. Both perspectives assume that the outcome will be the result of a 
relatively centralized decision-making process in which a few powerful interests dictate the 
outcome. A far cry from cryptocurrency’s decentralized peer-to-peer rhetoric.
221. See, e.g., Jonald Fyookball, 12 Reasons Bitcoin Cash Is the Real Bitcoin,
BITCOIN.COM (Feb. 2, 2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/12-reasons-bitcoin-cash-real-bitcoin/;
Iyke Aru, Roger Ver Declares Bitcoin Cash to Be True Bitcoin, Market Forces Bring More 
Attention, (Nov. 20, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/roger-ver-declares-bitcoin-cash-to-
be-true-bitcoin-market-forces-bring-more-attention (quoting Ver as declaring “Bitcoin Cash is 
the Real Bitcoin and will have the bigger market cap, trade volume and user base in the fu-
ture.”).
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generally did not accept this claim, and Bitcoin Cash trades for a fraction of 
the value of Bitcoin.
The saga did not end there. Bitcoin still had its own consensus protocol 
changes to implement. The first part of the New York Agreement went off 
as planned, and SegWit was adopted.  However, Bitcoin’s core development 
team still opposed doubling the block size.222 Signatories to the New York 
Agreement began reneging on their support for the increased block size.223
In November 2017, the block size increase (known as SegWit2x) was sus-
pended for lack of support.224 Outraged commenters lamented, apparently 
without irony, that “[w]ithdrawing one’s support from important agreements 
erodes trust within the community.”225
1. Lessons from The DAO Smart Contract
The core reason that Nakamoto declared Bitcoin to be a trustless system 
was that encryption could replace trust. He argued that with strong encryp-
tion, “[d]ata could be secured in a way that was physically impossible for 
others to access, no matter for what reason, no matter how good the excuse, 
no matter what.”226 For Nakamoto, cryptocurrency meant that “without the 
need to trust a third party middleman money can be secure and transactions 
effortless.” 227 However, the halo of security extends well beyond the block-
chain itself, inducing participants to trust a host of third parties who act as 
middlemen. Participants in cryptocurrency find themselves trusting ex-
changes, wallets, and smart contracts, all under the halo of the blockchain’s
immutability.
Under the Statute of Frauds, any contract for the sale of land, or that 
cannot be fully performed within one year, must be reduced to a writing. As 
per the Uniform Commercial Code, contracts that involve the sale of goods 
for more than $500 must similarly be memorialized in writing.228 Thus, alt-
hough oral contracts can be enforceable, most contracts are written down on 
222. David Dinkins, Bitcoin Developers Remain Adamant in Opposition to SegWit2x, 
Potential Showdown in November, COINTELEGRAPH (Aug. 10, 2017), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/bitcoin-core-developers-remain-adamant-in-opposition-to-
segwit2x-potential-showdown-in-november.
223. Alyssa Hertig, F2 Pool Reneges: Bitcoin Pool Pulls Segwit2x Support over 
Hard Fork, COINDESK (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/
f2pool-reneges-mining-pool-pulls-segwit2x-support-hard-fork/.
224. Posting of Michael Belshe, mike@bitgo.com, to bitcoin-
segwit2x@lists.linuxfoundation.org (Nov. 8, 2017), https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/
pipermail/bitcoin-segwit2x/2017-November/000685.html.
225. Dinkins, supra note 203.
226. Satoshi Nakamoro, Bitcoin Open Source Implementation of P2P Currency, P2P
FOUNDATION (Feb. 11, 2009), http://p2pfoundation.ning.com/forum/topics/bitcoin-open-
source.
227. Id.
228. U.C.C. § 2-201 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2012).
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paper, and signed by the parties intending to be bound by the agreement. 
Smart contracts are a variation on this theme—with the agreement encoded 
on a blockchain rather than on paper. For technical reasons, most smart con-
tracts to date have been designed for the Ethereum blockchain rather than 
the Bitcoin blockchain. The main attraction of these smart contracts is the 
claim that using a blockchain makes the deal immutable. The code is the 
contract. Neither party can renege “thanks to the remorseless logic-
crunching of the machine, whose algorithm would execute, verify, and en-
force itself.”229 This immutability is pitched as a means of replacing trust.230
Because the execution of the agreement is no longer separate from the 
agreement itself, the idea is that trust becomes unnecessary. The touted ad-
vantage of these trustless, self-executing contracts is that they can reduce or 
eliminate the uncertainty and transactions costs associated with executing 
and/or enforcing a contract.
Yet, smart contracts also offer a good example of how participants can 
confuse their decision to trust the blockchain with trusting operations that 
use the blockchain. In particular, the saga of an Ethereum smart contract 
known as “The DAO”231 shows how smart contracts can fail disastrously, 
with consequences that undermine the integrity of the blockchain itself. In 
2016, an Ethereum startup called Slock.it created The DAO—a smart con-
tract that was pitched as a distributed venture capital firm. It was intended to 
pool contributor money, and then distribute that money to projects the con-
tributors voted to fund. On a now-deleted homepage, The DAO grandiosely 
proclaimed that it would “blaze a new path in business organization . . . op-
erating solely with the steadfast iron will of unstoppable code.”232 The DAO 
launched a two-month investment window on April 30, 2016. By the end of 
May 2016, the DAO had collected roughly 12 million Ether ($150 million at 
the time) from investors.233
In early June, commenters began pointing out serious vulnerabilities in 
The DAO’s code.234 In response, on June 12, 2016, Slock.it founder Stephan 
229. Kieron O’Hara, Smart Contract – Dumb Idea, 21 IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING 97,
97 (2017).
230. Id. (pointing out that this claim about smart contracts is particularly ironic because 
contracts are themselves a tool for building trust).
231. Distributed Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) is a term that describes smart con-
tracts, generally. However, ‘The DAO’ was a specific smart contract on Ethereum. Other 
DAOs exist. See e.g., DIGIX, https://digix.global (last visited Oct. 20, 2018) (Digix Global, a 
company that tokenizes gold on the Ethereum network, runs a DAO called DigixDAO that 
issues DGD tokens). Similarly, the cryptocurrency Dash is a DAO.
232. THE DAO, http://web.archive.org/web/20160622212302/https://daohub.org/ (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2018).
233. Christoph Jentzsch, The History of the Dao and Lessons Learned, MEDIUM:
SLOT.IT BLOG (Aug. 24, 2016), https://blog.slock.it/the-history-of-the-dao-and-lessons-
learned-d06740f8cfa5.
234. Peter Vessenes, More Ethereum Attacks: Race-To-Empty is Real, VESSENES (June 
9, 2016), http://vessenes.com/more-ethereum-attacks-race-to-empty-is-the-real-deal/.
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Tual took to social media to announce that no DAO funds were at risk,235
essentially saying “trust us.” Five days later, hackers diverted Ether worth 
nearly $60 million out of The DAO into a new account.236 The hackers used 
a technique called a “recursive call exploit” in which they asked the smart 
contract to give back Ether invested in the DAO multiple times before the 
DAO updated the internal balances.237 Observers watched the unknown 
hackers drain off funds, but because of The DAO’s “unstoppable code” they 
could not do anything to stop it.
Smart contract advocates found themselves in a bind. The code that was 
supposed to be the contract allowed this conduct to occur. The point of a 
smart contract is that once entered, it is supposed to inviolable—even if cir-
cumstances change, or the parties change their minds. Yet faced with flawed 
code, those who had eagerly bought into an “unstoppable code” suddenly 
found that attribute far less desirable than they had imagined.238
In an extremely contentious move, the Ethereum community decided to 
create a hard fork to reverse the transfers out of The DAO. Hard Fork oppo-
nents argued vociferously against the decision on the ground that it would 
violate the immutability of the blockchain, thereby undermining the percep-
tion that blockchain contracts were permanent.239 This excerpt of a reddit
post by derrend is a fairly typical recap of this argument.
Q: What makes a blockchain valuable?
A: They are immutable and record an accurate version of history.
Q: Is the ethereum blockchain immutable and does it represent an 
accurate version of history?
A: No.
Q: Was the integrity of the chain sacrificed in the interests of a 
small minority?
235. Stephan Taul, No DAO Funds at Risk Following the Ethereum Smart Contract ‘Re-
cursive Call’ Bug Discovery, MEDIUM: SLOT.IT BLOG (June 12, 2016), https://blog.slock.it/
no-dao-funds-at-risk-following-the-ethereum-smart-contract-recursive-call-bug-discovery-
29f482d348b.
236. See, Ledgerwatch,  I Think TheDao is Getting Drained Right Now, REDDIT (June 
17, 2016, 3:10 AM), https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oi2ta/i_think_thedao_is_
getting_drained_right_now/; Vitalik Buterin, Critical Update Re: DAO Vulnerability,
ETHEREUM BLOG (June 17, 2016), https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-
dao-vulnerability/.
237. Antonio Madera, The DAO, the Hack, the Soft Fork and the Hard Fork,
CRYPTOCOMPARE (July 26, 2016), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-
the-hack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork/.
238. Subsequent forensic investigations found that a majority of Ethereum smart con-
tracts ignore best-practices and are therefore vulnerable to hacks. See Zikai Alex Wen & An-
drew Miller, Scanning Live Ethereum Contracts for the “Unchecked-Send” Bug, HACKING,
DISTRIBUTED (June 16, 2016), http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/16/scanning-live-
ethereum-contracts-for-bugs/ (calling Ethereum smart contracts “notoriously error-prone.”).
239. Madera, supra note 237.
36 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 25:1
A: Yes
Q: If the NSA or the FBI demanded a transaction reversal on the 
ETH blockchain and ordered the foundation to do so, would they?
A: Yes, judging by precedent.240
Hard Fork opponents pointed out that altering the blockchain is a slip-
pery slope241 and once the blockchain is modified in this fashion, there will 
inevitably be further calls for other modifications.242 More fundamentally, 
they argued that a hard fork to reverse this hack would violate the basic 
principle that “code is law.”243 Proponents of the hard fork retorted that the 
“code is law” approach lacks nuance and ignores the dynamic nature of 
law.244 Instead, they offered a vision of decision-making in which human 
beings get to think and make choices that amount to a social consensus.245
Ultimately, the hard fork was put up for a vote. A supermajority of 
Ether holders approved the proposal, and the hard fork took place on July 
20, 2016.246 The hard fork created a new Ethereum chain. The first block on 
the new Ethereum chain deposited the funds lost from The DAO into an ac-
count available to The DAO’s original investors.247 However, a sizeable mi-
nority of users rejected the new chain, giving rise to two Ethereum chains—
Ethereum and Ethereum Classic.
Note the ironic role that trust plays in this drama—the immutable 
blockchain was altered in the name of reinstating trust in the blockchain af-
ter a smart contract developer failed to live up to the trust placed in it. This 
decision unquestionably highlights the fragility of the much-touted immuta-
bility of the blockchain. It is demonstrably not accurate to say that a block-
chain transaction cannot be reversed—an assertion that is the cornerstone 
for the notion that the blockchain can replace trust.248 The DAO incident 
240. derrend, Comment to Code is Law, REDDIT (Sept. 5, 2016, 7:45 PM), 
https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/51bca4/code_is_law/#bottom-comments.
241. Weaknesses, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Weaknesses (last visited Oct. 
31, 2018) (“If it becomes possible for coins to be blacklisted in this way, then it is a slippery 
slope toward blacklisting of other ‘suspicious’ coins.”).
242. For a sense of the content of these objections, see Arvicco, Code is Law and the 
Quest for Justice, ETHEREUM CLASSIC BLOG (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://ethereumclassic.github.io/blog/2016-09-09-code-is-law/.
243. See id.; see also Lawrence Lessig, Code is Law: On Liberty in Cyberspace, HARV.
MAG. (Jan. 1, 2000), https://harvardmagazine.com/2000/01/code-is-law-html.
244. See Madera, supra note 237.
245. See id.
246. Id.
247. Michael del Castillo, Ethereum Executes Blockchain Hard Fork to Return DAO 
Funds, COINDESK (Jul. 20, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-executes-blockchain-
hard-fork-return-dao-investor-funds/.
248. See Robert Graham, Bitcoin: In Crypto We Trust, ERRATA SECURITY: BLOG (Dec. 
19, 2017), https://blog.erratasec.com/2017/12/bitcoin-in-crypto-we-trust.html (claiming that 
“the manifesto behind Bitcoin is that a transaction cannot be reversed—and thus, can always 
be trusted”).
Fall 2018] Myth of the Trustless Transaction 37
demonstrates that the blockchain is only as immutable as its community of 
users decides it is. That means that trusting that immutability is really trust-
ing the community to make the right choice. If it happened once, it could 
happen again, including for far less savory reasons.
Indeed, Ethereum Hard Fork opponents were prescient in their assertion
that The DAO hard fork would encourage others to request similar treat-
ment. After a hacker exploited a vulnerability in wallets run by the company 
Parity, the company sought a hard fork to undo the hack.249 The hacker took 
control of 587 wallets holding 513,774.16 Ether (worth roughly $300 mil-
lion at the time.)250 The user then destroyed the wallets, effectively freezing 
those coins.251 Parity developers have requested another Ethereum hard fork 
to recover at least some of these coins.252
The decision of whether or not to accede to this request roiled the 
Ethereum network.253 It turns out that stuck, non-recoverable Ether is a rela-
tively common problem.254 User error in the command line, software bugs,255
and intentional hacks like the one at Parity have all created millions of dol-
lars worth of “stuck” Ether, inaccessible to its owners.256 Commenters have 
pointed out that having those coins taken out of circulation increases the 
value of the remaining Ether—creating a clear conflict of interest between 
those whose Ether is not locked and the unfortunate victims of the Parity 
hack or other stuck situations.257
249. See Parity Technologies, A Postmortem on the Parity Multi-Sig Library Self-
Destruct, PARITY: BLOG (Nov. 15, 2017), https://paritytech.io/a-postmortem-on-the-parity-
multi-sig-library-self-destruct/.
250. Id.; Alex Hern, ‘$300m in Cryptocurrency’ Accidentally Lost Forever Due to Bug,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/nov/08/
cryptocurrency-300m-dollars-stolen-bug-ether.
251. See Parity Technologies, supra note 249.
252. Id. (conceding that “there is no timeline for when such an improvement proposal 
could be implemented.”).
253. See Adam James, Ethereum Community Votes Down $318 Million Parity Refund 
Request, BITCOINIST.COM (April 25, 2018), https://bitcoinist.com/ethereum-community-
votes-330-million-parity-refund-request/.
254. See Parity Technologies, On Classes of Stuck Ether and Potential Solutions, 
PARITY: BLOG (Dec. 11, 2017), https://paritytech.io/on-classes-of-stuck-ether-and-potential-
solutions/.
255. Peter Vessenes, Ethereum Contracts are Going to Be Candy for Hackers,
VESSENES.COM (May 18, 2016), http://vessenes.com/ethereum-contracts-are-going-to-be-
candy-for-hackers/.
256. Parity Technologies, supra note 254.
257. See Editorial Team, Parity to Ethereum Foundation: One Hard Fork, Please,
COINBUREAU (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.coinbureau.com/smart-contracts/parity-ethereum-
foundation-one-hard-fork-please/.
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2. The Unrealized Vulnerabilities of Cryptokitties
The recent craze over Cryptokitties highlights another mistake of con-
flating the blockchain with smart contracts that use the blockchain. Cryp-
tokitties are so-called non-fungible tokens. Each Cryptokitty is cartoon-like 
digital cat.258 Users use Ether to purchase tokens that give them ownership 
of the virtual cats, each of which has a unique identity logged on the 
Ethereum blockchain. In late 2017, demand for these kitties nearly broke the 
Ethereum network.259 At least one purchaser offered over $110,000 for a kit-
ten, though most sell for far less.260 The value proposition for these kittens 
as collectables rests on the immutable nature of the Ethereum blockchain. 
Promotional materials promise that “each cat is one-of-a-kind and 100% 
owned by you; it cannot be replicated, taken away or destroyed.”261 Yet, it is 
not clear that United States property law recognizes nonfungible tokens as 
property.262
The hype around these digital cats is an example of how the block-
chain’s aura of immutability spreads over related, but distinct entities, 
sweeping them within the halo of trust. All the Cryptokitties exist in one 
Ethereum smart contract.263  As one commenter points out, “as far as 
Ethereum is concerned there is only a single version of the KittyOwnership 
contract, and that contract is owned by a single wallet. It doesn’t get more 
centralized than this.”264 Indeed, the developers themselves acknowledged 
that their decentralized app had multiple centralized aspects.265 This struc-
ture has practical implications that directly contradict the marketing lan-
guage behind Cryptokitties. The contract holder retains near total control 
over the fate of the kittens. Should it choose to, the contract holder could 
258. CRYPTOKITTIES, https://www.cryptokitties.co/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
259. See Olga Kharif, Cryptokitties Mania Overwhelms Ethereum Network’s Pro-
cessing, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-04/
cryptokitties-quickly-becomes-most-widely-used-ethereum-app. Since then, demand has fad-
ed. Indeed, one analyst reports that by August 2018 Cryptokitty’s user base had plummeted by 
96%. Decentralized Apps Facing Half-Life After Peak, DIAR (Aug. 20-27, 2018), 
https://diar.co/decentralized-apps-facing-half-life-after-peak/.
260. Joseph Young, Ethereum-Based Cryptokitten Sells for $117,712, COINJOURNAL
(Dec. 3, 2017), https://coinjournal.net/ethereum-based-cryptokitten-sells-117712/.
261. Understanding CryptoKitties, CRYPTO KITTY WORLD, http://cryptokittyworld.com/
(last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
262. Kyle Wood & Taylor Lindman, Why the Next CryptoKitties Mania Won’t Be 
About Collectables, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 21, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/21/why-
the-next-cryptokitties-mania-wont-be-about-collectables/.
263. Luke Zhang, Your CryptoKitty Isn’t Forever - Why DApps Aren’t as Decentralized 
as You Think, MEDIUM (Dec. 3, 2017), https://medium.com/loom-network/your-crypto-kitty-
isnt-forever-why-dapps-aren-t-as-decentralized-as-you-think-871d6acfea.
264. Id.
265. David Floyd, Decentralizing Popular Dapps Isn’t Just a Scaling Problem, 
COINDESK (June 28, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/decentralizing-popular-dapps-isnt-
just-scaling-problem/.
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pause the contract—sending all Cryptokitties into permanent hibernation.266
Moreover, Cryptokitties creator Axiom Zen retains total discretion to 
change the breeding algorithm, with the possibility of making previously 
rare (and expensive) kitten traits commonplace.267 There is no reason to 
think that these things will happen, but they could. Purchasers dazzled by 
the blockchain do not even realize how much they are trusting Cryptokitties, 
Inc. to behave in a fashion that maintains the value, and indeed the very ex-
istence of their purchases. While posters on reddit express concern about the 
reliability of the wallets holding their expensive kittens,268 they do not ex-
press the same concerns about the underlying contract. It is highly likely 
that they have no idea of the vulnerability built into their purchase. The lev-
els of trust embedded in this trustless system are dangerous—lulling people 
into a false sense of security about transactions that are in fact quite vulner-
able.
C. Trusting Wallets and Platforms
Most individuals do not interact directly on the blockchain. They instead 
interact through platforms or wallets or other intermediaries that purport to 
help them buy, sell, and hold cryptocurrencies. These interactions create a 
new set of trusted intermediaries. Nakamoro’s vision for bitcoin of a peer-to-
peer network with no need to trust third-parties has instead morphed into a 
system with multiple intermediaries, all of whom cloak themselves in the au-
ra of the blockchain. His gripe that trusting banks meant “[w]e have to trust 
them with our privacy, trust them not to let identity thieves drain our ac-
counts”269 applies just as clearly to cryptocurrency third parties. It turns out 
that cryptocurrency requires the same trust, only this time it is placed in un-
regulated, non-transparent actors.
These cryptocurrency third parties have too often failed to live up to the 
trust placed in them. Even avid cryptocurrency supporters acknowledge that 
in the cryptocurrency universe, scandals and frauds are rampant.270 Despite 
the purported immutable security of the blockchain, there are plenty of ways 
for thieves to steal cryptocurrency. Indeed, rapidly rising prices, anonymity, 
266. In the Parity hack described above, this is what a malicious user did to the wallets.
267. Floyd, supra note 265.
268. See e.g., kryptofan, Comment to Where Exactly is my Kitty on the Blockchain,
REDDIT (Jan. 19, 2018, 10:05PM), https://www.reddit.com/r/CryptoKitties/comments/7rio31/
where_exactly_is_my_kitty_on_the_blockchain/.
269. Satoshi Nakamoto, Comment to Bitcoin Open Source Implementation of P2P Cur-
rency, P2P FOUNDATION (Feb. 11, 2009, 10:27PM), http://p2pfoundation.ning.com/forum/
topics/bitcoin-open-source.
270. Coinbrief, Bitcoin vs USD vs Gold—Here’s Why Bitcoin Wins, 99BITCOINS (Jan. 2, 
2018), https://99bitcoins.com/bitcoin-gold-usd/. For a list of some of the scandals, see Coin-
brief, Mt. Gox, Mintpal, Hashfast, Butterfly Labs, and Robocoin: Blunders in Bitcoin Busi-
ness, 99BITCOINS (Feb. 22, 2018), https://99bitcoins.com/bitcoin-business-blunders/.
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and lack of regulation make cryptocurrency exchanges “natural targets” for 
theft271 and scams. Hacks and thefts are common occurrences. And because 
of cryptocurrency’s decentralized, unregulated and irreversible nature, vic-
tims find themselves largely without recourse.272 One major cryptocurrency 
investor summed up the situation clearly when he tweeted about one of the 
many cryptocurrency trading platform scandals: “Is it unfair? Of course. If 
you want fair, cryptocurrency isn’t for you. Stick with assets that are based 
on trusting the regulatory and legal infrastructure.”273
1. Hacks and Thefts
As of late 2017, Reuters estimated that 980,000 coins, worth up to $15 
billion had been stolen in the prior six years from cryptocurrency wallets 
and platforms.274 The following is a list of just a sampling of the most recent 
cryptocurrency hacks since then:275
July 2018—Israeli platform Bancor was hacked. Cryptocurren-
cy worth over $23 million stolen.276
June 2018—South Korean platform Bithumb was hacked. 
Cryptocurrency worth $37 million stolen.277
June 2018—South Korean platform Coinrail was hacked. 
Coins worth over $40 million stolen.278
271. Steven Melendez, Bitcoin Heist Adds $77 Million to Total Hacked Hauls of $15 
Billion, FASTCOMPANY (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40505199/bitcoin-
heist-adds-77-million-to-hacked-hauls-of-15-billion.
272. See, e.g., Kai Sedgwick, Cheated Cryptocurrency Investors are Taking Matters into 
Their Own Hands, BITCOIN.COM (Dec. 21, 2017), https://news.bitcoin.com/cheated-
cryptocurrency-investors-taking-matters-hands/ (describing various ineffectual self-help at-
tempts by defrauded cryptocurrency investors).
273. Ari Paul (@AriDavidPaul), TWITTER (Dec. 20, 2017, 6:35 AM), 
https://twitter.com/AriDavidPaul/status/943489940352061440.
274. Jim Finkle & Jeremy Wagstaff, Hackers Steal $64 Million from Cryptocurrency 
Firm NiceHash, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-nicehash/
hackers-steal-64-million-from-cryptocurrency-firm-nicehash-idUSKBN1E10AQ.
275. Yugi Nakamura, The Wretched, Endless Cycle of Bitcoin Hacks, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-17/the-wretched-
endless-cycle-of-bitcoin-hacks.
276. Jon Russell, The Crypto World’s Latest Hack Sees Bancor Lose $23.5M,
TECHCRUNCH, (July 11, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/10/bancor-loses-23-5m/. In 
this hack, a Bancor wallet was hacked and used to steal money from associated smart con-
tracts. Bancor (@Bancor), TWITTER (July 9, 2018, 4:35 PM), https://twitter.com/Bancor/
status/1016420621666963457.
277. Nick Chong, Breaking News: Bithumb Hacked for $30 Million in Cryptocurrencies, 
Market Drops, NEWSBTC (June 20, 2018), https://www.newsbtc.com/2018/06/20/breaking-
news-bithumb-hacked-for-30-million-in-cryptocurrencies-market-drops/.
278. Tim Culpan, $2.3 Billion in Losses Highlights Crypto’s Moral Hazard,
BLOOMBERG OPINION (June 11, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-
06-11/-2-3-billion-in-losses-highlights-crypto-s-moral-hazard.
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February 2018—CISCO confirmed that a Ukrainian hacker 
group called Coinhorder stole $50 million from Block-
chain.info wallets.279
February 2018—Bitgrail informed users that 17 million Nano 
had been stolen, worth $170 million.280
January 2018—Japanese platform Coincheck was hacked for 
$530 million—making it the largest cryptocurrency hack ev-
er,281 outstripping the 2014 Mt. Gox hack in which $400 mil-
lion was stolen.282
January 2018—Blackwallet announces it has been hacked ad-
vises customers not to log in to their accounts. 700,000 lumens 
stolen (value $400,000).
January 2018—Users on the Bitcoin cash Reddit (commonly 
known as /r/BTC) reported their Tippr accounts had been 
hacked and emptied out of their funds.283
December 2017—YouBit (S. Korea) thieves stole cryptocur-
rency worth $35 million dollars, or 3/5 of clients’ holdings on 
the platform.  Company filed for bankruptcy284
December 7, 2017—NiceHash thieves stole 4700 bitcoin—
worth more than $75 million at the time.285 NiceHash described 
itself as “the largest marketplace for mining digital currencies.”
It appears that the hacker entered the system with credentials 
for one of NiceHash’s engineers.
279. Jen Wieczner, Hackers Stole $50 Million Using ‘Poison’ Google Ads, FORTUNE
(Feb. 14, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/02/14/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-blockchain-wallet-
hack/. This was a theft rather than a hack. Coinhoarder created fake google ads for fraudulent 
sites. People googling common cryptocurrency terms like blockchain or Bitcoin wallet were 
directed to malicious sites posing as the real thing. It was this sort of scheme that prompted 
Facebook to ban all cryptocurrency advertising in early 2018.
280. Adam Reese, Class Action Suit Against Nano Core Devs Calls for Hard Fork,
ETHNEWS (April 9, 2018), https://www.ethnews.com/class-action-suit-against-nano-core-
devs-calls-for-hard-fork.
281. Daniel Shane, $530 Million Cryptocurrency Hack May Be Largest Ever, CNN BUS.
(Jan. 29, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/29/technology/coincheck-cryptocurrency-
exchange-hack-japan/index.html.
282. Jose Pagliery, How Mt. Gox Went Down, CNN BUS. (Feb. 26, 2014), https://
money.cnn.com/2014/02/25/technology/security/bitcoin-mtgox/index.html.
283. Bryan Menegus, How a Reddit Email Vulnerability Led to Thousands in Stolen 
Bitcoin Cash, GIZMODO (Jan. 5, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/reddit-email-vulnerability-leads-
to-thousands-of-dollar-1821808073.
284. Daniel Shane, Bitcoin Exchange Goes Bust After Hack, CNN BUS. (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/20/technology/south-korea-bitcoin-exchange-closes/
index.html.
285. Rishi Iyengar, More Than $70 Million Stolen in Bitcoin Hack, CNN BUS. (Dec. 8, 
2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/07/technology/nicehash-bitcoin-theft-hacking/
index.html.
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November 2017—Bitfinex, which had previously lost millions 
of dollars of customer money in multiple hackings, was hacked 
again, this time losing $30 million of Tether from online wal-
lets.286
Unfortunately, the list could go on and on. These hacks illustrate how trust 
in third parties that surround the blockchain might be misplaced. As the 
Wall Street Journal reported, cryptocurrency platforms are getting hacked 
because lack of regulation makes it “easy.”287
Thefts and hacks aside, many platform users have been unpleasantly 
surprised at how easily cryptocurrency trading platforms can unilaterally 
make choices that limit user access to their funds. The instances that follow 
describe a few of the most high-profile instances.
2. Access to Bitcoin Cash
The Bitcoin Cash hard fork highlighted the unanticipated trust that ho-
dlers were placing in trading platforms that managed their trustless crypto-
currency. Akin to how shares are distributed after a corporate spin-off, each 
hodler was slated to receive one Bitcoin Cash for each Bitcoin they held on 
the day of the hard fork. Bitcoin Cash’s promotional website specifically
distinguishes Bitcoin Cash from bank accounts which it claims “are only as 
safe as political leaders describe. Even under the best of conditions, banks 
can make mistakes, hold funds, freeze accounts and otherwise prevent you 
from accessing your own money.”288 By contrast, Bitcoin Cash promised to 
give users “full, sovereign control over your funds, which you can access 
from anywhere in the world.”289
Coinbase and Blockchain.info, two of the largest currency platforms, 
had other plans. These platforms opted not to support the new currency at 
the time of the hard fork.290 That meant that any customers with bitcoin on 
286. Stan Higgins, Tether Claims $30 Million in US Dollar Token Stolen, COINDESK
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/tether-claims-30-million-stable-token-stolen-
attacker. Bitfinex lost 1,500 Bitcoin, worth around $330,000, to a hacker in 2015. Izabella 
Kaminska, BITCOIN BITFINEX EXCHANGE HACKED: THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS, FIN.
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/1ea8baf8-5a11-11e6-8d05-4eaa66292c32.
In August 2016, Bitfinex was hacked again, losing almost 120,000 Bitcoin, worth around $66 
million at the time. Stan Higgens, The Bitfinex Bitcoin Hack: What We Know (and Don’t
Know), COINDESK (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/bitfinex-bitcoin-hack-know-
dont-know. One of the more significant consequences of the 2016 Bitfinex hack is described 
infra pp. 44-46.
287. Steven Russolillo and Eun-Young Jeong, Cryptocurrency Exchanges are Getting 
Hacked Because It’s Easy, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2018).
288. Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN CASH, https://www.bitcoincash.org/#faq (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2018).
289. Id.
290. Class Action Complaint at 6, Berk v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 4:18-cv-01364-KAW 
(N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 1, 2018); William Suberg, Blockchain.info Releases Full Bitcoin Cash 
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either platform would not receive their Bitcoin Cash, and could not access, 
use or sell the coins. Indeed, Coinbase made it very clear that customers
“will only have access to the current version of bitcoin we support (BTC). 
Customers will not have access to, or be able to withdraw, bitcoin cash 
(BCC).”291 In other words, the platforms took it upon themselves to prevent 
their customers from receiving valuable property that, by all ordinary 
measures, those customers owned and were entitled to receive. Bitcoin ho-
dlers discovered that their trustless, immutable cryptocurrency was actually 
held at the mercy of the platforms they had trusted perhaps without realizing 
it.
Worse, Coinbase advised clients wishing to receive their Bitcoin Cash 
to withdraw their bitcoin from the platform,292 cautioning that during the 
hard fork, “customers would not be able to withdraw any version of any 
Bitcoin from Coinbase.”293 In other words, the platform used its power to 
shut down cryptocurrency owners’ ability to buy or sell their coins. As cus-
tomers raced to withdraw their bitcoin before the hard fork, Coinbase re-
ported experiencing “a high backlog.”294 With transactions taking up to 12 
hours to process, customers complained that they were locked into Coinbase 
and its decision about Bitcoin Cash.295 Blockchain.info waited two months, 
until mid-October to credit Bitcoin accounts with Bitcoin Cash.296 Coinbase 
waited even longer, finally crediting customers with their Bitcoin Cash on 
December 19, 2017,297 months after the hard fork occurred. During the inter-
im, customers lost the opportunity to sell their coins. More importantly, they 
Support, Users Receive Coins, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 12, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/
news/blockchaininfo-releases-full-bitcoin-cash-support-users-receive-coins.
291. Coinbase GDAX Reiterate Position on Bitcoin Cash: Njet! TRUSTNODES (July 28, 
2017), https://www.trustnodes.com/2017/07/28/coinbase-gdax-reiterate-position-bitcoin-cash-
njet.
292. David Farmer, Update for Customers With Bitcoin Stored on Coinbase, COINBASE 
BLOG (July 27, 2017), https://blog.coinbase.com/update-for-customers-with-bitcoin-stored-
on-coinbase-99e2d4790a53.
293. Class Action Complaint at 6, Berk v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 4:18-cv-01364-KAW 
(N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 1, 2018); see also Farmer supra note 292 (reiterating that “We plan to 
temporarily suspend bitcoin buy/sells, deposits and withdrawals on August 1, 2017 as the fork 
is likely to cause disruption to the bitcoin network. This means your funds will be safe but you 
will be unable to access your bitcoin (BTC) for a short period of time.”).
294. Class Action Complaint at 6, Berk v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 4:18-cv-01364-KAW 
(N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 1, 2018).
295. See Coinbase Faces Exodus as Bitcoiners Race to Withdraw, Delays up to 12 
Hours, TRUSTNODES (July 30, 2017), https://www.trustnodes.com/2017/07/30/coinbase-
faces-exodus-bitcoiners-race-withdraw-delays-12-hours.
296. William Suberg, Blockchain.info Releases Full Bitcoin Cash Support, Users Re-
ceive Coins, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 12, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/
blockchaininfo-releases-full-bitcoin-cash-support-users-receive-coins.
297. See Bitcoin Cash FAQ, COINBASE, https://support.coinbase.com/customer/portal/
articles/2911542 (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
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lost their trust in the promise that cryptocurrency offered them interference-
free transactions.298
3. Bitfinex Hack
Two months after the DAO fiasco, hackers attacked the cryptocurrency 
platform Bitfinex. The hackers stole 119,756 Bitcoins (worth more than $65 
million at the time).299 Bitfinex responded by halting trading, deposits and 
withdrawals, and canceling out all margin positions.300 This move harkened 
back to Mt. Gox’s 2014 decision to stop investors from pulling out their 
money when the platform discovered it was under attack.301 In the Mt. Gox 
situation, the exchange filed for bankruptcy and the users lost their mon-
ey.302
A few days after the hack, Bitfinex unilaterally announced that it had 
“generalized the losses across all accounts,”303 by reducing all customer 
holdings by 36%. The trading platform unilaterally decided to dock custom-
er accounts. It would be unimaginable for a bank, regulated under United 
States law to take such a course of action in response to embezzlement or a 
bank robbery. But cryptocurrency trading platforms are at most loosely reg-
ulated, and Bitfinex is based in Hong Kong, well beyond the jurisdiction of 
United States regulators. Thus, the company was free to act as it chose. In 
exchange for the reduced holdings, Bitfinex issued BTX (so-called “hack 
coins”) to users as a promise that it would return those funds at an unspeci-
fied future date.304 In October 2016, Bitfinex offered to pay a bounty if the 
hacker would agree to return the coins.305 It took Bitfinex six months to pur-
portedly redeem the hacked coins and reimbursed investors.306
298. See, e.g., Sue Marquette Poremba, What Is Bitcoin? Everything You Need to Know, 
TOM’S GUIDE (Feb. 5, 2018,) https://www.tomsguide.com/us/what-is-bitcoin,review-
5061.html (describing the inspiration for bitcoin as being “free from interference by govern-
ment and financial institutions.”).
299. Jethro Mullen, Hackers Steal Bitcoins Worth Millions in Attack on Exchange, CNN
(Aug. 3, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/08/03/technology/bitcoin-exchange-bitfinex-
hacked/index.html.
300. See Announcements > Security Breach, BITFINEX (Aug. 2, 2016), 
https://www.bitfinex.com/posts/123.
301. In this hack, 744,408 bitcoin were stolen, worth nearly $400 million at the time. 
David Goldman, 14 Biggest Tech Fails of 2014, CNN (Dec. 16, 2014), 
https://money.cnn.com/gallery/technology/2014/12/16/tech-fails-2014/11.html.
302. Jemima Kelly and Anna Irrera, Bitcoin Fever Exposes Crypto-Market Frailties,
REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-markets-bitcoin-risks-insight/
bitcoin-fever-exposes-crypto-market-frailties-idUSKBN1E724X.
303. Announcements: Security Breach - Update 3, BITFINEX (Aug. 6, 2016), 
https://www.bitfinex.com/posts/129. The company explains that it distributed the loss to mim-
ic what would have happened in a liquidation.
304. Id.
305. Announcements: Message to the Individual Responsible for the Bitfinex Security 
Incident of August 2, 2016, BITFINEX (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.bitfinex.com/posts/159.
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Bitfinex was not the only trading platform to commandeer investor as-
sets in a liquidity crunch.  On July 31, 2018, OKEx, a Chinese-run trading 
platform,307 invoked its ‘societal loss risk management mechanism’308 to 
cover losses associated with an enormous Bitcoin gamble gone wrong. 309 A
trader had made a heavily-leveraged bet (worth $416 million) that Bitcoin 
would rise against the US dollar.310 The trader was unable or unwilling to 
meet a margin call when Bitcoin’s value plunged. As per its forced liquida-
tion policy,311 OKEx liquidated the account. Unfortunately, the losses ex-
tended well beyond the assets available to cover them. The platform had an 
insurance fund for such situations, but since the insurance fund had only 10 
Bitcoin, it was rapidly depleted.312 OKEx reportedly contributed an addi-
tional 2500 bitcoin (worth $18.5 million at the time) to the insurance fund, 
but that was not enough to cover the total margin call losses generated by 
the situation.  To cover this shortfall, OKEx clawed back 1200 bitcoins 
(worth $8.8 million at the time) from other traders on the platform. That 
worked out to roughly 18% of profits from these other traders. Moreover, it 
is worth noting that the OKEx platform was no stranger to controversy, hav-
ing been accused a few months earlier of manipulating market prices in or-
der to liquidate margin positions,313 and fielding allegations that its trading 
The post suggested that the hacker contact Bitfinex on Tor to preserve his/her anonymity, as-
suring that “our interest is not to accuse, blame, or make demands, but rather to discuss an 
arrangement that we think you will find interesting.” Id.
306. Announcements: 100% Redemption of Outstanding BFX Tokens, BITFINEX (Apr. 3, 
2017), https://www.bitfinex.com/posts/198. See also Garrett Keirns, Bitcoin Exchange Bit-
finex Buys Back All Remaining ‘Hack Credit’ Tokens, COINDESK (April 2, 2017), 
https://www.coindesk.com/bitfinex-pledges-buy-back-remaining-hack-credit-tokens/.
307. OKEx is based in Hong Kong, and is Chinese run. See Avi Misrahi, Okex Fights 
Market Manipulation Rumors Following Painful Future Contracts Rollback, BITCOIN.COM
(April 4, 2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/okex-fights-market-manipulation-rumors-following-
painful-futures-contracts-rollback/. However, the company is actually a corporation registered 
in Belize. See Clarification of Recent Events, OKEX SUPPORT (April 3, 2018), 
https://support.okex.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002350972.
308. Regarding the Forced Liquidation Incident on Jul 31, 2018, OKEX SUPPORT,
https://support.okex.com/hc/en-us/articles/360011941512-Regarding-the-Forced-Liquidation-
Incident-on-Jul-31-2018 (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
309. Lucinda Shen, One Faulty $416 Million Trade On Bitcoin Puts Several OKEx 
Traders on the Hook, FORTUNE (Aug. 3, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/08/03/okex-losses-
among-counter-parties/.
310. Id.
311. See Forced Liquidation, OKEX SUPPORT (Jan. 18, 2018), https://support.okex.com/
hc/en-us/articles/360000139652-Forced-Liquidation.
312. See Austerity Sucks, The $415 Million Elephant in the Room (OKEx Futures Un-
filled BTCUSD Liquidation), MEDIUM (July 31, 2018), https://medium.com/
@Austerity_Sucks/the-415-million-elephant-in-the-room-okex-futures-unfilled-btcusd-
liquidation-aa601b188007.
313. See Clarification of Recent Events, OKEX SUPPORT (April 3, 2018),
https://support.okex.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002350972.
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volume was dramatically overstated.314 Even assuming that allegations about 
OKEx’s nefarious conduct are false, it seems clear that neither traders sub-
ject to the societal loss risk management mechanism, nor the platform itself 
were prepared for the magnitude of their exposure.
Imagine if a big bank took 18% of client funds to cover a big loan that 
went bad, or if E-Trade docked all customers 36% to cover thefts from other 
accounts. Time and time again, cryptocurrency users have discovered that 
they have unexpectedly trusted cryptocurrency platforms with powers far 
beyond their initial contemplation. The rhetoric about “trustless transac-
tions” obscured the multiple layers of trust actually implicated in trading on 
a cryptocurrency platform. The SEC has expressed concern that “many 
online trading platforms appear to investors as SEC-registered and regulated 
marketplaces when they are not. Many platforms refer to themselves as 
‘exchanges,’ which can give investors the mis-impression that they are 
regulated or meet the regulatory standards of a national securities ex-
change.”315 In short, platforms not only cloak themselves in the halo of the 
blockchain’s immutability, these unregulated entities also benefit from the 
halo of the regulatory trust generated through rigorous regulation of national 
securities exchanges.316
D. Trusting an ICO
Many of the new cryptocurrencies rely on a novel form of crowdfund-
ing called an “initial coin offering” or ICO. In an ICO, every unit of curren-
cy—usually Ether, dollars, or Bitcoin—an investor sends to a company’s
wallet represents a “smart contract” for purchasing ICO coins from the 
business. These ICO tokens purport to give investors special access to what-
ever the underlying business does, as well as giving the investor equity in 
the network. Theoretically, as the company’s product becomes popular, de-
mand for its coins or tokens will rise, boosting the value of those held by the 
initial investors. Entrepreneurs sell virtual currencies to investors to raise 
money for software they are building. Roughly 875 such projects raised 
over $6 billion in 2017.317
Even bracketing the judgments that go into assessing whether such an 
investment is likely to be lucrative, there are multiple levels of trust embed-
ded in these ICO interactions: first, trust that the company exists and is not 
merely a scam; and second, trust that the promoters have not struck secret 
314. Sylvain Ribes, Chasing Fake Volume: A Crypto-Plague, MEDIUM (Mar. 10, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@sylvainartplayribes/chasing-fake-volume-a-crypto-plague-
ea1a3c1e0b5e (alleging that over 90% of the platform’s volume was fabricated).
315. SEC, supra note 29.
316. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. pts. 201, 240, 242, 249 (2017).
317. The website Icodata.io tracks the activity of ICOs. Funds Raised in 2017,
ICODATA.IO, https://www.icodata.io/stats/2017 (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
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deals to promote or prop up their coins. These layers of trust are necessary 
for an ICO, but none of them can be protected by the blockchain’s touted 
immutability. In a more conventional transaction, SEC regulations would 
provide what I have elsewhere called “regulatory trust”318—regulatory as-
surances that provide confidence to the public.
Yet, in the new “trustless” world of the blockchain, regulatory trust 
does not apply, and instead these ancillary levels of trust get swept into the 
blockchain’s halo of reliability. As a result, “every new coin offering pre-
sents another chance to translate a flaky business into an absurd valua-
tion.”319 Take the April 2017 Gnosis ICO as an example. The company self-
described as “a user-driven prediction market” based on a coming “Cambri-
an explosion of machine intelligence.”320 At the time of the ICO, the compa-
ny was little more than an idea spelled out on paper and some open-source 
code. The company held a Dutch auction, hoping to raise $12.5 million dol-
lars by selling up to 10 million of its coins. The auction lasted 11 minutes, 
closing when the sale raised the targeted sum.321 Turns out, the company met 
its goal by selling only a fraction (about 42,000) of the 10 million coins al-
located to the auction. Gnosis suddenly had a market-ascribed valuation of 
$300 million. Within two months, that valuation had mushroomed to $3 bil-
lion (more than Revlon or Time Inc.) with each coin selling for hundreds of 
dollars.
Some have leveraged the buzz surrounding blockchains and the frenzy 
of ICOs to commit outright fraud. For example, the blockchain based fruit 
company Prodeum that was going to “revolutionize the fruit and vegetable 
industry”322 by “keep[ing] track of produce on the Ethereum blockchain”
launched an ICO on January 20th. The concept itself was not as far-fetched 
as it might sound. Walmart has been experimenting with blockchain pilot 
projects to track its produce.323 The technology has obvious applications for 
protecting the public during a food-related health scare, and might also re-
duce food waste.324 Yet, Prodeum was a scam. Nine days after the ICO be-
gan, Prodeum disappeared with investor money, leaving only the word “pe-
318. Bratspies, supra note 64 (discussing public trust in the government).
319. Laura Shin, The Emperor’s New Coins: How Initial Coin Offerings Fueled a $100 
Billion Crypto Bubble, FORBES, July 27, 2017, at 62, 65.
320. Id.; Gnosis Whitepaper, at 9 (Apr. 5, 2017), https://gnosis.pm/assets/pdf/gnosis-
whitepaper.pdf.
321. Shin, supra note 319.
322. Avi Mizrahi, Vegetables on Blockchain ICO Exit Scams After Paying People to 
Write on Their Bodies, BITCOIN.COM (Jan. 30 2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/vegetables-on-
a-blockchain-ico-exit-scams-after-paying-people-to-write-on-their-bodies/.
323. Sylvain Charlebois, Opinion, How Blockchain Could Revolutionize Food Industry,
GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-
commentary/how-blockchain-could-revolutionize-the-food-industry/article37305425/.
324. Id.
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nis” on its website.325 After the company disappeared, it turned out that they 
had used fraudulent images in a viral social media campaign—with “fans”
who showed support for the concept by writing #prodeum on their bodies 
turning out to be freelancers hired from a task website.326 At least one of the 
people identified on the now-defunct Prodeum website as a company found-
er claimed that he had no association with the company and was instead a 
victim of identity theft.327 According to a recent report from the ICO adviso-
ry firm Satis Group, 78% of the ICOs in 2017 were scams, and another 7% 
had failed or otherwise gone dead.328
According to an account in Forbes magazine, one ICO creator offered 
one crypto asset hedge fund manager the following deal: “If you agree to 
buy tokens at the ICO and support the price, then 30 days later, we’ll secret-
ly sell you any leftover tokens at a lower, pre-agreed price.”329 In the stock 
market, such an offer would amount to felony insider trading. Yet, ICO or-
ganizers manage to sidestep securities regulations by claiming that they are 
not actually offering a share in the company. The SEC is poised to crack 
down on this practice, issuing a statement indicating that “by and large, the 
structures of initial coin offerings . . . involve the offer and sale of securities 
and directly implicate the securities regulations.”330 Acting on this statement, 
the SEC has brought fraud charges against at least one unlicensed platform 
and its founder.331 In May of 2018, regulators in the United States and Cana-
da conducted “cryptosweep,” a coordinated enforcement action cracking 
down on fraudulent ICOs. The effort resulted in scores of cease and desist 
letters against fraudulent or deceptive practices.332 Many more such investi-
325. Brian Feldman, The Blockchain- for-Vegetables StartUp Website Was Replaced 
with the Word Penis and No One Has a Clear Explanation As to Why,
N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 29, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/
2018/01/prodeum-scam-cryptocurrency-for-produce-disappears.html.
326. See Mizrahi, supra note 322.
327. Mix, Cryptocurrency Startup Prodeum Pulls an Exit Scam,  Leaves a Penis Behind,
NEXT WEB (Jan. 29, 2018), https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2018/01/29/cryptocurrency-
prodeum-scam-exit-penis/.
328. Sherwin Dowlat, Cryptoasset Market Coverage Initiation: Network Creation,
SATIS GRP. 24 (July 11, 2018), https://research.bloomberg.com/pub/res/d28giW28tf6G7T_
Wr77aU0gDgFQ.
329. Shin, supra note 319, at 69.
330. CHAIRMAN JAY CLAYTON, SEC, STATEMENT ON CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND 
INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/
statement-clayton-2017-12-11.
331. SEC, SEC CHARGES FORMER BITCOIN-DENOMINATED EXCHANGE AND 
OPERATOR WITH FRAUD, (2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-23.
332. State and Provincial Securities Regulators Conduct Coordinated International 
Crypto Crackdown, N. AM. SEC. ADM’R ASS’N (May 21, 2018), http://www.nasaa.org/45121/
state-and-provincial-securities-regulators-conduct-coordinated-international-crypto-
crackdown-2/.
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gations are ongoing, and regulators warn that these enforcement actions “are 
just the tip of the iceberg.”333
ICO issuers are not the only group engaging in fraudulent practices. 
Some online groups openly try to manipulate the prices of cryptocurrencies 
through pump-and-dump schemes.334 These actors create countdown clocks 
for their coordinated pumping action, designed to move the price of a crypto-
currency. 335 Members pay for access, and for information to allow them to 
participate in the profitmaking.336 The website PumpMyCoin is fairly typi-
cal.337 One twitter user going by the name @pumpanddumpking boast “I will 
tweet out which coin will be pumped on binance. Join my personal pump 
and dump group below !!!”338 Wallet Investor keeps a Pump & Dump Cryp-
tocurrency List indicating which currencies have moved more than 5% in 5 
minutes.339 Similar schemes involving stocks are illegal, but so far cryptocur-
rencies are a grey area. Indeed, the spokesperson for one pump and dump has 
stated the belief that the fraud rules against pump and dump for securities do 
not apply to cryptocurrency.340 Caveat emptor rules the day.
E. Government to the Rescue?
One of the touted trustless aspects of cryptocurrency is that it is free 
from governmental control.  And, indeed, cryptocurrencies have operated 
largely outside of existing regulatory systems—giving rise to a Wild West 
mentality. The technology’s boosters claim that “[c]ryptocurrency removes 
this need to trust someone by incentivizing every actor in the network to not 
333. Id.
334. Akshay Makadiya, A Breakdown of Cryptocurrency ‘Pump and Dump’,
BTCMANAGER.COM (Jan. 24, 2018 0:30) https://btcmanager.com/breakdown-cryptocurrency-
pump-dump/.
335. Id.
336. See Bruno, The Anatomy of a Pump & Dump Group, BITFALLS (12/01/2018), 
https://bitfalls.com/2018/01/12/anatomy-pump-dump-group/.
337. See Pump But Never Dump, PUMPMYCOIN, https://pumpmycoin.com/ (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2018). Pumpmycoin self-describes as “a cryptocurrency voting community that will 
choose the next coin to pump.” Where Pumpmycoin claims to differ from “other pump and 
dump scam/groups” is that this group “maintain[s] its uptrend to make sure that our communi-
ty members are satisfied with their gains.” Id.
338. @PumpandDumpKing Bio, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/pumpanddumpking (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2017) (“I will tweet out which coin will be pumped on binance. Join my per-
sonal pump and dump group below !!!”).
339. Pump and Dump Cryptocurrency List, WALLET INVESTOR,
https://walletinvestor.com/pump-and-dump (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
340. Ryan Mac, Bitcoin Scammers Are Using this App to Fleece People, BUZZFEED
(Jan. 25 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/cryptocurrency-scammers-
are-running-wild-on-telegram (“[CryptoCallz administrator Maxwell Anderson] acknowl-
edged that ‘[i]t is an unfortunate situation for anyone left holding the bags,’ but noted that as 
long as his group members saw consistent profits they weren’t particularly worried about oth-
ers getting hurt.”).
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debase the currency341 and not commit fraud.”342 Yet, frauds that leverage the 
aura of cryptocurrency to scam would-be investors are common.343 Wildly 
fluctuating values driven by speculation, along with the possibility of dirty 
deals, undermine the idea that one can view cryptocurrency as “trustless.”
Governments are increasingly exerting control over various aspects of 
cryptocurrencies, sometimes with serious ramifications for the expectations 
of users. Bitcoin originated as a cryptocurrency. There are quite a few re-
tailers, mostly small and online that accept bitcoin.344 However, cryptocur-
rency’s touted anonymity has a dark side—it has been used to evade taxes, 
launder money and trade illicit goods.345 For that reason, cryptocurrencies 
have drawn the scrutiny of regulators around the world who are concerned 
that cryptocurrencies facilitate illegal activities ranging from drug peddling 
to terrorism to child pornography on the so-called Dark Web.346
In the United States, the Department of Justice and the Treasury De-
partment’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) have used an-
ti-money-laundering provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act to go after crypto-
currency exchanges engaged in illegal activities.347 In January 2017, the 
341. The author of this particular claim uses the following parable as an example: “The 
buyer or seller of goods and services in the transaction must make the same assumptions you 
do; if 1 cow is worth 100 dollars today and 1000 dollars tomorrow, why would you sell 1 cow 
today?” Chia, supra note 22. Yet, $100 today, $1000 tomorrow (and $10 the day after) is a 
pretty good description of the price fluctuations cryptocurrencies routinely experience.
342. Id.
343. See SEC Charges Texas Man With Running Bitcoin Denominated Ponzi Scheme,
SEC (July 23, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2013-132.
344. Some big players like Virgin, Overstock.com and Bloomberg are on this list. Jonas 
Chokun, Who Accepts Bitcoin as Payment? List of Companies, Stores and Shops,
99BITCOINS, https://99bitcoins.com/who-accepts-bitcoins-payment-companies-stores-take-
bitcoins/ (last updated September 13, 2018). However, bitcoin reportedly made up only 
0.0002% of Overstock’s revenues in 2016-17. Jamie Toplin, Merchants Aren’t Accepting 
Bitcoin, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 14, 2017 12:12PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/merchants-
arent-accepting-bitcoin-2017-7. Subway is also on this list, but after a video of a reporter try-
ing, and failing, to pay with bitcoin went viral, Subway issued a statement that “Each local 
Subway is independently owned and operated and it is the individual franchisee’s decision to 
accept this form of payment. We are not aware of any restaurants currently accepting this 
payment.” Emmanuel Ocbazghi, Graham Flanagan & Sara Silverstein, I Spent A Day Trying 
to Pay for Things With Bitcoin and a Bar of Gold, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 24, 2017 11:15AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/trying-to-pay-for-things-with-bitcoin-price-gold-2017-10.
345. See Tristan Greene, Study: 44% of Bitcoin transactions are for illegal activities,
TNW (Feb. 7, 2018), https://thenextweb.com/cryptocurrency/2018/02/07/study-44-of-bitcoin-
transactions-are-for-illegal-activities/.
346. Aatif Sulleyman, Bitcoin Price is so High Because Criminals are Using it For Ille-
gal Trades, Research Suggests, INDEPENDENT (Wednesday 24 January 2018 11:39), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/bitcoin-price-fall-criminals-
blockchain-anonymous-cryptocurrency-zcash-monero-dash-a8174716.html.
347. See Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging or 
Using Virtual Currencies, FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (March 18, 2013), 
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/guidance/application-fincens-
regulations-persons-administering.
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operators of cryptocurrency exchange Coin.mx pled guilty to multiple felo-
nies associated with bank fraud.348 Six months later, FinCEN settled money 
laundering charges against filed cryptocurrency exchange BTC-e for $110 
million.349 Perhaps the best-known case involved the criminal prosecution 
involving the Silk Road, an infamous Dark Web site. In 2015, its creator 
Ross Ulbrecht was sentenced to life in prison for multiple felony convic-
tions stemming from his operation of the website. However, such actions 
barely scratch the surface.  Despite the massive investigation and prosecu-
tion, Silk Road was up and running again in short order.
The United States is not alone in reacting to the illicit uses of cryptocur-
rency. China,350 South Korea, India, Bolivia, Ecuador, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco 
and Nepal have all taken steps to outlaw, or severely restrict, the use of 
cryptocurrencies as a medium of exchange.351 Japan, by contrast, is one of 
the few countries where cryptocurrency is legally recognized as currency.352
After the Coincheck hack, Japan cracked down on cryptocurrency exchang-
es, suspending two exchanges and fining five others.353 Merchants that ac-
cept cryptocurrency as payment still typically price their goods in fiat cur-
rency, and immediately convert any paid in cryptocurrency to fiat 
currency.354
348. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OPERATORS OF UNLAWFUL BITCOIN EXCHANGE 
PLEADS GUILTY IN MULTIMILLION-DOLLAR MONEY LAUNDERING AND FRAUD SCHEME 
(Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/operator-unlawful-bitcoin-exchange-
pleads-guilty-multimillion-dollar-money-laundering.
349. Assessment of Civil Money Penalty at 9, In re BTC-E, No. 2017-03 (Dep’t of 
Treas., Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, July 26, 2017), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/
default/files/enforcement_action/2017-07-27/
Assessment%20for%20BTCeVinnik%20FINAL2.pdf.
350. Saheli Roy Choudhury, China bans companies from raising money through ICOs, 
asks local regulators to inspect 60 major platforms, CNBC (2:51 AM Mon., 4 Sept. 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/04/chinese-icos-china-bans-fundraising-through-initial-coin-
offerings-report-says.html.
351. Amanda Razani, Countries that Have Banned Cryptocurrency for Now, COIN 
CLARITY (Dec. 19, 2017), https://coinclarity.com/countries-that-have-banned-cryptocurrency-
for-now/#; Kate Rooney, Your guide to cryptocurrency regulations around the world and 
where they are headed, CNBC (March 27, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/27/a-
complete-guide-to-cyprocurrency-regulations-around-the-world.html; India bans crypto-
currency trades, BBC (April 6, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-
43669730.
352. Kate Rooney, Your guide to cryptocurrency regulations around the world and 
where they are headed, CNBC (March 27, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/27/a-
complete-guide-to-cyprocurrency-regulations-around-the-world.html.
353. Rishi Iyengar, Japan Cracks Down on Cryptocurrency Exchanges After Massive 
Hack, CNN (Mar. 8, 2018, 3:48 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/08/investing/japan-
cryptocurrency-exchanges-crackdown/index.html.
354. C. Edward Kelso, 80,000 New Merchants in Europe Gain Option to Accept Crypto,
BITCOIN.COM (Mar. 27, 2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/80000-new-merchants-in-europe-
gains-option-to-accept-crypto/; Utrust, The vast majority of merchants are still afraid to ac-
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As cryptocurrencies have entered the mainstream, supporters have at-
tempted to shed its criminal reputation. Most new buyers do not treat their 
bitcoin as a means of exchange and payment. Rather, purchasers are ho-
dlers—buying cryptocurrency “as a speculative investment, attracted by 
massive price gains.”355 Perhaps because they recognize this investor behav-
ior, both the IRS and the SEC treat cryptocurrency as property rather than as 
a currency. The IRS has issued guidance specifically clarifying that it does 
not consider bitcoin as a currency, 356 and requiring investors to report capi-
tal gains and losses any time they transfer cryptocurrency.357 This IRS deci-
sion has an important ramification. Any exchange of cryptocurrency for 
goods, services, or a fiat currency may generate a taxable gain or loss, de-
pending on the relationship between the fair market value on the day of ex-
change and on the day of acquisition.358 The IRS treats this gain or loss as 
ordinary income rather than a capital gain.359 To enforce this rule, the IRS 
recently won a lawsuit against the cryptocurrency exchange Coinbase, re-
quiring the company to turn over account information for 14,000 users sus-
pected of tax avoidance.360 The relevance of the actual legal system to cryp-
tocurrency transactions seems to have come as a surprise to some users. 
Outraged customers took to social media to vent their outrage and sense of 
betrayal when Coinbase issued 1099-K forms to its users in January 2018.361
cept crypotcurrencies, MEDIUM (Jan. 24, 2018), https://medium.com/@UTRUST/why-the-
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The Commodities Futures Trading Commission, CFTC, allowed futures 
trading for Bitcoin in September 2017. In December 2017, CME Group and 
Cboe Global Markets Inc. both launched bitcoin futures.362 The very next 
month, in January 2018, the CFTC brought three fraud cases for unlawful 
solicitation with regard to Bitcoin futures.363 The CFTC has brought charges 
related to virtual currencies before. In 2016, the agency reached a $75,000 
settlement with Bitfinex for engaging in what the agency found to be “ille-
gal, off-exchange commodity transactions” and for failure to register as a 
futures commission merchant.364
The SEC has also gotten into the cryptocurrency enforcement game. 
The agency recently refused to approve three cryptocurrency exchange trad-
ed fund (ETF) proposals, citing concerns over valuation and verification.365
Previously the SEC classified the now-defunct DAO smart contract as a se-
curity,366 and took its first action to halt an ICO it deemed to be a scam.367
The SEC also issued a cease and desist order to at least one other company, 
362. The Cboe January 2018 futures contracts were settled on January 17, 2018 for 
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halting its ICO as an unregistered security.368 The SEC also created a fake 
ICO with a website spoofing a scam ICO in order to warn investors about 
the risks associated with ICOs.369 However, regulatory actions are few and 
far between. It is unclear where and how government will decide to inter-
vene in cryptocurrency markets, and even less clear whether those interven-
tions will be successful in protecting the public. 
Private actors are also beginning to exert influence over cryptocurren-
cies. Facebook recently banned cryptocurrency ads. Major credit card issu-
ers Capital One, Discover, J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America and 
Citigroup have all banned cryptocurrency purchases by their credit card cus-
tomers.370 British banks Lloyds Banking Group and Virgin have followed 
suit, as has Canada’s TD Bank.371 The banks cite concern over volatility as a 
major justification for this policy.372 However, it is worth noting that many 
of these institutions also identify competition from cryptocurrency as a po-
tential business risk.373 Prior to the ban, 18% of cryptocurrency purchasers 
reported using credit cards for their purchases, with nearly a quarter of those 
purchasers reporting that they had not paid off the balance.374
V.  Conclusion
A significant degree of trust is simply inescapable.375 As blockchain ex-
pert Preethi Kasireddy noted, “Blockchain governance is an incredibly tricky 
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problem and finding a balance between centralized and distributed control 
will be essential to maintaining everyone’s trust in the system.”376 The notion 
that one can trust in the immutability of the blockchain spreads a halo of 
trust over the universe of cryptocurrencies. Combined with the lack of gov-
ernment oversight, this trust halo makes cryptocurrencies “almost a perfect 
vehicle for scams.”377 The blockchain rhetoric of a trustless system obscures 
the many places at which a market participant must trust another, sometimes 
dubious, actor. As one commenter noted, “[e]verything requires trust. Aside 
from tautologies, it’s impossible for you to verify anything without putting 
your trust somewhere.”378 Cryptocurrencies currently relocate that trust from 
regulators and the commercial actors they oversee, to nameless, faceless ac-
tors accountable to no one. Moreover, those cryptocurrency interactions are 
typically not mediated by the conventional regulatory signifiers of trust in 
financial transactions.
Ironically, the success of “trustless” cryptocurrency depends large-
ly on trust. Indeed, blockchain, the limited supply of coins, the lack of 
centralized control—the very things that purportedly make it a system 
that does not require trust—are all touted as reasons to trust this tech-
nology. For example, the cryptocurrency Dash claims to be a form of de-
centralized governance run by its masternodes. Its website contains advice 
for how to start a “hosted masternode.”379 Yet Dash’s explanation of its gov-
ernance system also proclaims that “[e]very masternode operator establishes 
a bond of trust and a social contract with the network in which she is bound 
to contribute to the development and maintenance of the ecosystem she 
benefits from.”380 As crypto bull, Michael Novogratz stated that,
“Bitcoin is based on an amazing technology. There’s a limited supply 
of it, people are trusting it.”381
At the same time, the lack of trustworthiness in cryptocurrency has cre-
ated something of a crisis. As ADustedEwok noted, “No matter what, at 
some point your money will be in the hands of a 3rd party. At which point 
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it’s vulnerable.”382 This vulnerability has created insecurities like those 
found in a recent Reddit thread, discussing an announced theft of roughly $2 
million in bitcoin from an individual’s wallet. The conversation ranged from 
worried owners who had “always trusted” the service in question,383 to oth-
ers advising “DO NOT TRUST ANYONE” 384 to cynics doubting any theft 
had happened at all.385 The original poster bemoaned  “I don’t know what to 
trust,”386 prompting a user to advise, “I personally put my trust in hardware 
wallets.”387
In response to the NiceHash hack, a poster called Showthatflop ex-
pressed what is a fairly common sentiment when s/he posted “How do we 
know that they were hacked for real and it wasn’t a planned scam since the 
begging [sic] and now EVERYTHING is a hack? How do you trust them or
trust someone?”388 The message is clear—users are on their own. As one 
reddit poster chastised those sharing their losses: “It’s your job to se-
cure your funds. It can be done easily. It was your decision to trust 
people who didn’t deserve your trust, either because they weren’t com-
petent enough to secure their bitcoins or because they ran with your 
money389 Or as another commenter noted, “This decentralized nature of 
the bitcoin network is not without consequences—the main one being that if 
you screw up, it’s your own damn problem.”390
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The subtext to these discussion threads is that everyone is always vul-
nerable; predators are everywhere, and the slightest mistake is enough to 
create catastrophe. And there is no recourse. It is only after catastrophe has 
occurred that many cryptocurrency users realize just how many nameless, 
unaccountable people they had blithely trusted during their interactions with 
the much-touted trustless blockchain system. Their new world order resem-
bles Lord of the Flies far more than Utopia. A finance blogger who goes by 
the name Mr. Money Moustache summed it up nicely when he wrote,
“Government-issued currencies have value because they represent human 
trust and cooperation. There is no wealth and no trade without these two 
things . . . There are no financial instruments that will protect you from a 
world where we no longer trust each other.”391
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